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ABSTRACT 
THE INVISIBLE CRISIS: 
FRAMING THE REMEDIATION OF MILWAUKEE’S LEAD LATERALS 
 
by 
Isabella Rieke 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2018 
Under the supervision of Professor Ryan Holifield 
 
 
When Milwaukee’s municipal water system was developed in 1874, one-half-inch lead 
pipes were used to convey water from the mains in the street to a customer’s home; the City has 
since acknowledged that nearly 100,000 such lead pipes are still in use today, a revelation which 
has opened for debate whether or not these pipes pose a galvanizing public health risk with far-
reaching policy and infrastructure implications. This study explores the community response to 
Milwaukee’s lead laterals through the efforts of the Freshwater for Life Action Coalition 
(FLAC).  How do Milwaukeeans understand the risks posed by the lead laterals? In what ways 
do they believe themselves, the City of Milwaukee, or other actors to be responsible for 
remediating these risks? How has FLAC framed the issue to energize their local social activist 
movement? Even more so, is there some about lead, specifically, which makes it difficult to 
organize a movement? How does lead itself play a role in understanding risk and responsibility 
in this social movement? By exploring the factors that contribute to how Milwaukeeans 
understand the risks posed by the lead pipes, this study seeks to understand in what ways — if at 
all — they consider themselves and the City to be responsible for remediating those risks. 
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1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Shortly after I moved to Milwaukee in August of 2016, a friend and I were listening to a 
radio piece covering the ongoing lead poisoning and lack of safe, drinkable water in Flint, 
Michigan.  “People aren’t even talking about it, but we have those here too, you know,” she said 
to me.  She was referring to Milwaukee’s lead laterals, the subterranean pipes that connect each 
property to the city’s water mains.  A careful search of the Milwaukee Water Works’ website 
confirmed not only that Milwaukee had lead laterals, but also that they were connected to over 
70,000 residences throughout the city — including my own.  Over the next year and a half, I 
developed a strange, uneasy relationship with my tap: although I knew my trusty water filter 
pitcher was not lead-certified, I continued to drink from it on a daily basis.  I tried to flush the tap 
for at least three minutes each morning, as the City’s website instructed, but if I was in a rush (as 
I often was) I was willing to settle for a minute, at best.  Each morning, I boiled tap water to 
make myself coffee, nervously brushing away the thought that boiling water can increase lead 
concentration.  In my home, I only drank filtered water, but I refilled my water bottle at bubblers 
throughout the day, and warily drank tap water when it was served to me in restaurants.  I spoke 
often with others about my research, explaining the ubiquity of lead laterals even as I was 
changing precious little about my own daily behaviors.  It was only in recent months that I 
upgraded to a lead-certified water filter, after over a year of researching Milwaukee’s lead 
laterals and the activists who were trying to have them replaced.  Although I knew — better than 
most — the risks associated with lead laterals, my pipes were not keeping me up at night, nor 
were they even compelling me to change my routines.  So what, exactly, was going on here? 
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This is precisely the conundrum faced by a group of local organizers dedicated to the 
remediation of Milwaukee’s lead laterals; although the specter of risk looms large, it seems to be 
just that — spectral, and not quite compelling enough for Milwaukee residents to choose to take 
on the mental, emotional and financial burdens required to mitigate the risks for themselves and 
their family.  Although I might have been wary of my tap’s potentially harmful effects, the risk 
seemed so far away, so easy to ignore, that I was willing to live with my own negotiated 
discomfort.  My water never made me feel sick, and I was never put off by its taste, color or 
smell; nothing had changed about my objectively safe, drinkable water, except for the revelation 
that it was potentially, unmeasurably dangerous.  Further, no one was going to mitigate this 
indiscernible risk for me — the government had no plans to replace the pipes, and my landlord 
had no interest in assuming the massive costs.  If I took seriously the risks my taps posed, I 
would need to take unilateral steps to protect myself.   
I had enough on my plate.  I put it out of my mind.  
•       •       • 
In 2015, tests revealed lead levels of more than 100 parts per billion — nearly seven 
times the federal safety level — in 24 of Wisconsin’s 72 public county water systems (Schmidt 
& Hall 2016a).  Among other events, these test results have compelled the City of Milwaukee to 
acknowledge that more than 70,000 such lead pipes are still in use today, and have opened for 
debate whether or not these pipes pose a galvanizing public health risk with far-reaching policy 
and infrastructure implications.  The driving force behind this debate is Robert Miranda, the lead 
organizer of the Freshwater for Life Action Coalition, or FLAC.  Miranda and his group have 
spent the last three years organizing and lobbying for government action, demanding full 
removal of the lead service lines at no cost to homeowners.  This study is drawn from over a year 
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and a half of qualitative research into the group’s efforts, methods, victories and challenges.  
What initially began as an opportunity to follow an emergent social movement spearheaded by 
community organizers quickly morphed into something more complex, as the uniqueness of the 
group’s efforts — and more importantly, the uniqueness of their obstacles — became clear. 
For FLAC, one of the major obstacles has been deciding how best to communicate the 
risks of lead contamination in a way that mobilizes public and political support. This is a central 
question in social movement theory, which is often addressed using the language of “collective-
action frames,” discourses employed by social movements to legitimate and motivate activism 
(Benford & Snow 1992).  These frames articulate values, beliefs, concerns and goals, making 
sense of events in such a way as to highlight collective identity and motivate collective action.  
These frames can serve several different tasks (see Table 1): diagnostic frames identify a 
problem and attribute blame; prognostic frames suggest solutions for the problem; and 
motivational frames provide a rationale for activism. 
At its core, this study has two very simple research questions: what collective-action 
framings has FLAC employed, and what challenges have they faced?  To that end, I provide an 
exploration of the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framings the group employed and 
some of the hurdles they faced.  In part, I do this by asking what might be gleaned from where 
the group’s framings have been successful versus where it has faced opposition or been forced to 
adapt.   
In response to the first question, this thesis argues that four characteristic framings were 
most routinely employed by FLAC activists over a period of two years, including that the City of 
Milwaukee is untrustworthy and more concerned with protecting its own interests than with 
remediating the lead laterals (section 5.1); that the community is insufficiently aware of the issue 
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(section 5.2); segregation in Milwaukee produces uneven effects and differential political 
opportunity structures (section 5.3); and that the City’s current responses have been insufficient 
(section 5.4). As I trace the major components of the framing, I answer the second research 
question above with two arguments. The first is that the subdued response to FLAC’s 
motivational framing, or their calls for activism, stems in part from a tension in the group’s 
prognostic framings or proposed solutions, to which municipal and organizational actors have 
responded by focusing their efforts on short-term mitigation strategies — such as distributing 
filters to residents — rather than long term proposals for full remediation.  If effectively 
managed and equitably distributed, these short-term solutions can be a tremendous boon for 
residents, nearly eliminating the risks posed by lead laterals.  However, this also means that a 
bifurcated response may have the effect of managing the crisis in the short term, relieving the 
political pressure for elected officials to answer FLAC’s demands with a comprehensive solution 
for a problem which has been managed (nearly) out of existence.  
In addition to the elements of FLAC’s framings, this study explores some of the 
unanticipated findings that have proven to be far more complex than the unassuming research 
questions would suggest, demonstrating the precariousness of FLAC’s efforts.  First and 
foremost, the findings in this study show that one of the group’s most significant challenges is 
the increased devolution of responsibility for managing the risks of contaminated pipes, which 
stems in large part from the short-term solutions referenced above.  These proposed interim 
solutions shift the onus for mitigation strategies from government officials to dutiful residents, 
who are held increasingly accountable for securing their own health outcomes.  As noted, when 
responsibility for mitigating the risk of lead exposure is increasingly shifted to individual 
residents, attention and resources are primarily directed to quick fix, “band-aid” solutions that 
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mitigate — rather than remove — the risks associated with lead pipes.  This has the dual effect 
of not only shifting emphasis away from comprehensive municipal solutions for full removal, but 
also minimizing the magnitude of the public health crisis, thereby minimizing the need for such 
long-term solutions.  Additionally, not every Milwaukee resident has the ability to bear the 
mental, emotional and financial burdens of the proposed short-term solutions; if residents are 
made increasingly responsible for their own short-term solutions, safety becomes not only a 
choice but a luxury, and one that not every resident can afford.  
As my own personal experience with lead laterals demonstrates, this shifting of 
responsibility is further complicated by the invisibility and unknowability of lead and its 
attendant risks, which play a critical role in residents’ decisions to adopt or ignore the mitigation 
strategies presented to them.  Both lead and the networks — social, political, economic, 
historical — within which Milwaukee’s lead laterals are contained play roles in conditioning and 
shaping the political opportunity structure.  I therefore argue, as an additional part of my answer 
to the second research question, that it is not simply the distinctiveness of lead, but instead the 
distinctiveness of how lead is situated in Milwaukee, that has played a tremendous role in 
shaping public and political perceptions and FLAC’s remediation efforts.  For this reason, 
although comparisons to Flint might seem intuitive, the two cases are not entirely analogous.  
This thesis attempts to make clear not only the difficulties of organizing around urban lead, but 
in organizing around Milwaukee’s urban lead, in particular.    
What, then, are the problems that arise when lead risk is invisible?  For organizers, the 
first hurdle has been convincing residents that the risk is real, widespread and dangerous.  
Because the effects of lead poisoning are often associated with or disguised by other factors, this 
is no small feat.  The majority of scientific study has focused on the effects of lead on children, 
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and scientific consensus on the long term-effects of continuous low levels of lead on adults 
remains relatively elusive.  However, studies have shown that lead poisoning can affect behavior, 
intelligence and fertility, and can lead to heart disease, high blood pressure and kidney disease 
(CDC 2017, Lanphear et al. 2018, Navas-Acien et al. 2007).  The majority of these lead-related 
health outcomes commonly associated with genetics or ‘lifestyle choices,’ masking their 
connection to lead exposure.  Further, many of the most effective mitigation strategies which 
could prevent these health outcomes from ever becoming ‘visible’ are attributable to wealth and 
Whiteness, meaning the effects of lead poisoning are unevenly distributed across the population.   
Lead exposure is closely tied to the age and quality of housing stock, the ability of some 
property owners to replace old lead pipes and abate any lead paint can reduce their lead exposure 
to undetectable levels.  The effects of lead exposure can also be mitigated through a ‘healthy’ 
diet; healthiness is here represented by a very particular and structured kind of diet, as the diets 
that are known to mitigate lead effects are low in sugar, with no snacks or processed foods.  
Snack foods and sweets frequently sold and consumed in low-income non-White neighborhoods, 
in particular those imported from Mexico, have been found to be packaged with lead-
contaminated wrappers (Fuortes & Bauer 2000).  This means that, even if all Milwaukeeans 
suffered equal rates of lead exposure, non-White residents and any Milwaukeeans living with 
food insecurity would not have access to a fundamental means of mitigating its effects, making 
the embodied effects of the same exposure invisible for some and hazardous for others.  For 
organizers, this invisibility is presents a major obstacle; it requires that FLAC not only persuade 
Milwaukee residents that their seemingly clean, drinkable water is dangerous, but also that they 
illuminate what may have contributed to a (misplaced) sense of security in the water’s patent 
drinkability.  Specifically, the group must highlight the role of residents’ inadvertent behaviors 
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and socioeconomic status in unevenly mitigating risk, as contrasted to the government's 
presumed municipal ability to uniformly eradicate any hazards.  
There are inevitable limitations with a study of this nature, which engages with a current 
and evolving movement that changes with every passing day.  It is well beyond the scope of this 
paper to map all of the framings employed by activists, or all of the nuanced ways in which they 
are attempting to respond to risk.  Instead, I have analyzed the framings most routinely employed 
by organizers over the course of my research, which means that there is a substantial amount of 
FLAC’s work which remains unexamined.  However, I have represented as faithfully as possible 
the efforts of the group as they were explained to me, using an inductive coding method to infer 
connections between statements made by organizers and activists.  A further limitation of this 
study is the lack of analysis of City counter-frames, which may seem to suggest that half of the 
story has been omitted.  To this, I can say that my research was focused on FLAC, and their 
efforts to organize.  Any analysis of the City, therefore, is through their eyes as it was applied in 
their framings.  Although analysis of the City’s counter framings might add context to the 
language FLAC employed, I do not think my findings suffer from the exclusion; this paper does 
not attempt to paint a comprehensive picture of the issue, as seen from all sides — rather, it is an 
attempt to track the idiosyncratic victories and obstacles of one local social movement.   
The chapter that follows situates this case study within the existing literature on social 
movement theory and collective-action frames, and argues that these theoretical bodies of work 
are insufficient to explain the unique challenges faced by Milwaukee organizers.  Instead, this 
thesis argues that we must draw upon other bodies of literature, such as those examining the role 
of non-humans, to more thoroughly consider the unique challenges of FLAC’s activism.  A 
subsequent background chapter explores the formation of FLAC and the current crisis of lead 
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laterals, and traces the development of Milwaukee’s water system and its history of tracking the 
impacts of lead pipes, as well as the city’s vested interest in water technology and resiliency.  
The methodology chapter explains the methods used to collect and analyze data, as well as some 
of the limitations of the methods employed.  Lastly, the data collected from participant 
observation, in-depth interviews and analysis of survey data will be used to analyze FLAC’s 
efforts to organize around Milwaukee’s lead laterals, and to parse the uniqueness of the varied 
accomplishments and hurdles the group has encountered.  
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2 - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
This thesis builds on the existing literature on social movement theory and “collective-
action frames” (Benford 1993, Benford and Snow, 2000, Snow 2013) to explore how FLAC has 
employed certain “frames” (Goffman 1974) to shape their mobilization efforts.  In this section, I 
explore existing research on social movements, with a specific focus on how we might 
differently examine local social movements (LSMs) as distinct from larger, more formalized 
social movement organizations (SMOs).  Because of the similarities between this case study and 
other environmental justice movements, I rely on examples from environmental justice (EJ) 
literature that demonstrate how place and scale are both defined and leveraged in the framings 
employed by LSMs to produce meaning and motivate action (Kurtz 2003, Martin 2003).  I also 
turn to scholarship on the agency of non-humans (Latour 2005, Robbins 2007) to further expand 
our understanding of who — or what — is involved in the development and deployment of 
certain frames, a factor which I contend has been largely overlooked by theories of social 
movements and frame construction.  In this capacity, I ask whether there is something about 
urban lead which makes it a uniquely difficult focus for social movement actors, with reference 
to the history of urban lead organizing and the recent examples of SMO activity in Flint, 
Michigan. 
 
2.1 Social Movements and Local Social Movements (LSMs) 
Social movements can be thought of as sustained contentious collective actions to further 
certain social or political goals (Tarrow 1998).  The scholarship on social movements has 
developed from initially viewing these movements as random, somewhat episodic bursts of 
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collective behavior, wherein feelings of marginalization and alienation were seen to motivate 
participation in social movements (see McPhail 1991).  Although this theory of collective 
behavior has been repudiated, this branch of scholarship held that collective behavior events are 
incited by ‘anomie’ or social disorganization, an understanding of social movements as an 
inevitable class conflict or social breakdown.  More recent scholarship has shown that social 
movements are in fact more likely to be comprised by less marginalized, more socially integrated 
members of society, emphasizing the role of rational choice and effectively reclaiming protest as 
a normal and organized activity of which rational individuals can choose to partake (Olson 
1965).  This position inspired a new wave of social movement scholarship focused on resource 
mobilization and political opportunity (Gamson 1980, Jenkins 1983, Tilly 1978).  These theories 
emphasize the importance not only of resource mobilization — money, people, networks, 
legitimacy — but also of formalized social movement organizations (SMOs) to accrue, wield and 
deploy these resources in certain conducive political contexts.  It might be argued that aspects of 
resource mobilization theory go too far in overcorrecting for prior social movement theory by 
assigning such a degree of organization and rationality — the introduction of concepts such as 
SMOs and other formalized groups — that social movements begin to appear guided by 
economic and entrepreneurial aims, competitively ‘branding’ their framing to appeal to potential 
participants (Tarrow 1998).  A political process model, by contrast, sees SMOs as neither 
irrational mobs nor savvy entrepreneurial outfits; rather, they are a link between people and their 
political institutions, exploiting political ‘openings’ or opportunities for social actors to who lack 
regular access to power and institutions to become involved in collective action (Tarrow 1998).  
Following the social movements of the 1960s, a set of “new” social movement theory has drawn 
from a European tradition, emphasizing the ways in which modern, post-industrial social 
  
11 
 
movements are fundamentally different from social movements of the past (Habermas 1981). 
The group of theorists focus in particular on how these “new” social movements differ in their 
goals, focusing on the evolution of the public sphere and issues of human rights.   
The emphasis routinely given to the importance of resource mobilization and political 
opportunity in motivating collective action tends to reinforce the study of large or even national 
social movements as the primary focus of social movement scholarship, given their ability to 
access, accumulate and mobilize resources in order to capitalize upon political opportunities.  
However, many social movements are neither large nor national, and even organizations as 
localized as neighborhood groups may be considered social movements in that they bring 
together residents with a variety of resources to address an array of political, social and economic 
issues, albeit at the neighborhood level.  In this paper, I apply the term “local social movements” 
(LSMs) to refer to informal organizations with ad hoc structures and limited resources that 
operate within a focused or limited spatiality, varying in scale from block-level to city-wide 
organizations.  Although they have less formalized organizational structures than SMOs, LSMs 
still work to demand change from formalized governance structures; they simply do so by 
defining priorities and politics at a scale other than that of the local government (Martin 2003).  
This complex negotiation of scale situates the localized grievances of an LSM in discourse with 
the broader scale of local (community, municipal, county) government, by both highlighting 
locally specific issues and injustices and relating them to the broader spatial and political context 
within which they occur. 
For LSMs, windows of political opportunity may be remarkably idiosyncratic based upon 
the scale at which they occur and the political structures and regimes within which they arise.  
Even LSMs working within the same political context may have differentiated access to 
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resources and political opportunities.  Ferman (1996) examines the role of neighborhood 
mobilization in urban regimes by exploring the differential responses to neighborhood 
mobilization in a comparison study between Pittsburgh and Chicago; her assessment of regime 
theory is an instructive step towards integrating research on neighborhood organization into our 
conception of urban politics, and how we might differently examine the opportunities presented 
by political opening not only between cities, but amongst neighborhoods within a given city.  
Political ‘openings’ can portend widely divergent social, political, and economic possibilities for 
different communities, a unevenness that LSMs must contend with but may also harness to their 
advantage. 
 
2.2 Frame construction in social movements 
Framing, or the “schemata of interpretation,” (Goffman 1974) is useful in understanding 
how social movements define and legitimate their activism through the development of meaning 
and vocabularies.  Framing theories fill a gap in the conventional resource mobilization and 
political opportunity literature by describing how social movement actor interpret events and 
situations such that they become meaningful and, more importantly, guide action.  A central 
focus of traditional social movement theory is to understand what compels people to participate; 
as previously noted, this scholarship traditionally calls our attention to the more structural 
elements of social movements, such as resource mobilization and political opportunity.  Through 
these more structuralist lenses, frames might be considered “resources,” which SMOs can 
mobilize to motivate participation in a particular social action (Benford & Snow 2000).  
However, this emphasis on resource mobilization and political opportunity largely presupposes 
the existence of grievances, as resources to be mined, and then asks what additional resources —  
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Table 1 - Framing Tasks 
Diagnostic frames Prognostic frames Motivational frames 
Discursive strategies used to identify a 
problem and attribute blame and 
causality, articulating victims and 
perpetrators. 
Interpretative packages used to develop 
strategies for action, propose solutions 
for an undesirable situation. 
Interpretive packages used to garner a 
public response, with direct suggestions 
for collective action, and vocabularies 
of motive as rationale for engaging in 
such activity. 
Who or what is the problem? 
How is it defined? 
How should we solve the problem? Why should I get involved?  
How can I? 
 
 
of which frames may be one — or opportunities are required to motivate participation.  Although 
scholarship on framing similarly focuses on what compels participation, it does not assume that 
grievances exist a priori, but rather that “meaning work” must be undertaken by movement 
actors to produce mobilizing ideas that necessitate social action (Benford & Snow 2000, Kurtz 
2003).  In this sense, framing may be considered a central dynamic that propels social 
movements, motivating action by simplifying an existing and complex reality into more parsable 
component parts, framing both a problem and its necessary response (Benford & Snow 2000).   
Inherent in this conception is the idea that framing is performed by some for others, “an 
active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality 
construction” whereby elites within the SMO are engaged in the evolving process of “the 
production and maintenance of meaning” through the development of discourses, or frames 
(Benford & Snow 2000, 614).  Using Snow and Benford’s (1992) conceptual heuristic of core 
framing tasks, collective-action frames can be broken into three primary elements: diagnostic 
framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing.  Diagnostic frames (see Table 1) are 
used to articulate not only the central grievance(s) of the movement but also the source and cause 
of such a grievance.  Diagnostic frames are similarly used to attribute blame and responsibility, 
to which prognostic frames may respond by advocating solutions for the diagnosed problem.  
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Motivational frames not only define the community that is affected, but provide vocabularies of 
motive (Benford 1993) — severity, urgency, efficacy, propriety — to signify compelling reasons 
for individuals to take action.  Taken together, this framing fostered by social movement actors 
motivates collective action through the articulation of shared social identities, and the seemingly 
kindred ways in which individuals make sense of events (Goffman, 1974).  
 
2.3 Place and scale in frame construction 
Although it is critically important to ask who is developing collective action frames and 
what they are designed to communicate, it is further helpful to understand how the geographic 
dimensions of that which is being framed dictates or in some way contributes to the ultimate 
framing.  Martin extends social movement theory to explore the specific role of place-based 
identity in motivating activism through collective-action frames, or what she terms “place-
frames” (Martin, 2003).  In this, the specificity of the place-frame helps to define collective 
identity by “situating activism in place,” drawing upon common experiences that are spatially 
related to define “the scope and scale of the shared neighborhood of collective concern” (Martin, 
2003).  Martin’s study of place-frames is helpful to our discussion of LSMs in that it examines 
the discursive role of community organizations in justifying both local activism and local 
identity, and how LSMs articulate neighborhood interests as ‘universal,’ superseding individual 
(divergent) identities and compelling collective action.  By employing a place-frame at the 
neighborhood scale, organizations can construct a specific, local spatiality as a legitimate space 
for political action, justifying and reinforcing mobilization at a scale smaller than the larger 
context within which the neighborhood exists.  These place-based frames allow us to more 
  
15 
 
effectively explore how a specific spatiality can be leveraged in the framing of social activism at 
a variety of scales.  
These discourses of scale are frequently seen in local environmental justice (EJ) 
movements, in that they often employ what Buell (2001) refers to as a “politics of elasticity,” 
relating the localized impacts of environmental injustices to the broader spatial and political 
factors which produce and maintain these injustices.  Small, local EJ movements are often 
defined by the tension inherent in articulating these spatial ambiguity between the local scale at 
which residents experience the negative embodied effects of pollution, and the more spatially 
diffuse scales at which environmental injustices are both produced and experienced (Harvey, 
1996; Pulido, 1996).  Therefore, local EJ movements must rely on these discourses of scale, 
simultaneously calling attention to the idiosyncrasies of their locally specific grievance while 
remaining in conversation with the broader sociopolitical implications of EJ writ large. 
Kurtz’s (2003) case study explores the role of scale in LSM framing, examining a 
proposed chemical facility in Louisiana through the lens of scale- and counter-scale frames.  
Scale frames, in Kurtz’s analysis, are both collective-action frames and discursive practices 
which “construct meaningful (and actionable) linkages between the scale at which a social 
problem is experienced and the scale(s) at which it could be politically addressed or resolved” 
(Kurtz, 2003 p 894).  These framings — of which there are multiple — allow for representations 
of the controversy at different “idioms of scale,” which may be successively used and reframed 
to target not only different potential solutions, but also different (inclusive) coalitions of 
activists.  The politics of scale play a particularly critical role in the politics of environmental 
justice, which as previously noted must simultaneously speak to broad — even global — issues 
of environmental justice, while remaining rooted in the locally specific EJ issue.  Kurtz finds that 
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locally specific EJ movements are utile in rooting the somewhat conceptual notions of 
environmental justice, which “cannot be formulated in the abstract, but must be understood with 
reference to the discursive strategies and material conditions of grassroots struggle” to 
accommodate lived (and localized) experiences and conceptions of environmental injustice. 
(Kurtz 2003, p 912).  Following Kurtz’s analysis, we must question how pre-existing geographic 
scales serve to articulate the lived experiences of those affected by environmental injustice, 
which is not always bounded by the same politically-articulated boundaries of space we 
colloquially understand. Scale frames can therefore benefit by incorporating more nuanced 
expressions of space — shifting, overlapping — explicitly leveraging ambiguity to their spatially 
specific political advantage without capitulating to the complex spatial ambiguity of 
environmental injustice. 
As Martin and Kurtz ably demonstrate, the place that is being framed — and the scale at 
which that place is articulated — make a difference to the frame that is ultimately employed.  
This literature on social movement frames sheds much light on how LSMs can motivate action, 
by employing place- and scale-frames which allow LSMs to define smaller spatial scales as 
legitimate spheres of action, and to link the multiple scales at which the effects of a spatially 
diffuse problem may be experienced.  Due in no small part to the spatially diffuse nature of 
environmental injustices, literature on environmental social movements goes further to engage 
with that which is being framed — the object, rather than the subject — than does traditional 
social movement theory.  However, it does not yet go far enough in exploring the role of the non-
human objects, issues and spatialities around which the LSM seeks to “produce meaning,” and 
how the specificity of these elements may contribute significantly to their ultimate framing.  This 
kind of a shift in focus would raise different questions, asking us to move from examining only 
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the agency and resources of the subject — social movements — to incorporating the same 
agential powers of the object — in this case of this thesis, lead laterals.  I contend that the work 
of Martin and Kurtz asks us to consider a possible gap in the existing literature on framing and 
social movements: that it does not yet take seriously enough the role of non-humans in shaping 
collective-action frames and productions of meaning.  To this end, we must make room in our 
analysis to examine the agency and ability of actors beyond the (human) SMO elites to not only 
co-frame social issues, but to inhibit or enhance the effectiveness of collective-action frames. 
 
2.4 Recognizing the role of non-humans in risk construction 
Engaging with the specificity of that which is being framed — in this case, Milwaukee’s 
lead laterals — allows us to explore the agency of non-humans in shaping the resultant framings 
employed by social movement actors.  Here, I employ the term “agency” in a more expansive 
sense than the traditional definition of agency, which is to say more than simply the capacity of 
humans (subjects) to make choices to act at will and affect others (objects).  Employing an 
expanded definition allows us to disrupt the subject-object dichotomy and account for differing 
forms of agency, such as the ability of non-humans to strive to adapt and alter their surroundings, 
for which social movement actors must (perhaps unwittingly) account.  Actor Network Theory 
(ANT) offers new ways of recognizing the agency of non-humans as an essential part of the 
relationship between society and the natural world (Latour 2005).  Through ANT, agency is 
understood to be interactional, operating relationally between different actants — a term used to 
refer to both humans and non-humans — in a manner that defies subject-object distinctions and 
deemphasizes the role of intentionality.  Taken this way, non-humans — animals, plants, 
weather, lead laterals — can be understood to exercise agency by creating order and disorder, 
  
18 
 
altering their surroundings both with or without intentionality.  An expanded notion of agency 
neither dismisses nor diminishes the significance of human agency, but instead situates it within 
a wider network of actants, wherein humans are participants rather than proprietors.  Through 
this lens, we may see the unique properties of lead laterals as more than simply anecdotal or 
coincidental, but rather as critical and agential in altering their surroundings, including the 
behavior of Milwaukee residents and social movement actants. 
In much the same way that ANT instructs us to look more closely at the network of 
forces and objects which together produce what might appear to be free will or agency, Michel 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality helps to articulate the relational power networks within 
which the self-governing citizen is made to be responsible for their risk calculations.  Through 
this lens, the simple hegemon of the state is not solely responsible for enforcing the actions of 
citizens.  Rather, individual subjects come to be responsible for animating themselves, driven by 
a governmentality which is internally motivated. Rutland and Aylett (2008) combine ANT with 
literature on governmentality, using the example of local environmental governance (LEG) in 
Portland, Oregon to explore how the local state enlisted the “self-governing capacities of its 
residents” to achieve its goals (Rutland & Aylett 2008, 627) and — borrowing from ANT — the 
‘translations’ it employed to do so.  Their seamless synthesis of these two frameworks produces 
a compelling argument that these two concepts can be used together to more fully understand the 
dynamics of urban governance, as political priorities are produced through a variety of actants 
that guide and construct meaning.  For the purposes of this thesis, these two perspectives are 
similarly helpful in understanding the dynamics of a local urban social movement focused on 
lead contamination. 
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Robbins (2007) employs ANT among other theories to examine the complex relationship 
between lawns and their suburban American ‘subjects’ (whom he refers to as “lawn people”), 
asking what causes suburban residents to avidly treat their lawns with chemicals, and how we 
can make sense of their decision to do so, given the anxiety such chemicals cause them.  
Following the logic of ANT, Robbins does not assume that “lawn people” choose to apply 
chemicals and scrupulously maintain their lawns simply because it is their desire to do so, but 
rather works to reveal the deeply embodied conditions, networks and actants which drive these 
decisions.  By acknowledging the networks within which individuals make decisions, especially 
risky ones, Robbins helps to locate some of the more surprising factors driving people to submit 
to — and willingly produce — environments at odds with their own health outcomes. It is worth 
asking in what ways “lawn people” are similar to what we might call “lead lateral people,” or the 
residents that knowingly live with lead laterals; they are both embedded within actor-networks 
which enable them to live with and re-produce a certain amount of risk or anxiety, in spite of 
their awareness of the risks.  What networks exist that make certain ‘risky’ conditions of the 
urban environment seem necessary or inevitable, and by what logic might “lead lateral people” 
submit to these conditions, in spite of the anxiety they cause?  What properties of the lead 
laterals, in particular, might be contributing residents’ ability to live with these negotiated risks? 
By situating risk and responsibility within the larger networks that produce them, we can 
interrogate the complex factors that together influence residents’ options and obligations in ways 
that might motivate them to — or dissuade them from — action. 
•       •       • 
 It is important to understand not only the theories that guide the study of social 
movements, but the particular resources those movements — and, in particular, local movements 
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— might use to advance their efforts.  For LSMs, framing is a resource of paramount 
importance, given that these small movements often have a dearth of other resources to leverage 
and limited political opportunities.  As this review has demonstrated, framings employed by 
smaller movements often benefit from nuanced understandings of place and scale, which allow 
them to articulate their specific, localized grievances in conversation with more spatially and 
politically diffuse concepts. Therefore, this current study seeks to examine how a local social 
movement leverages both place and scale in framing the issue of lead contamination, and further 
asks what are the limitations of such framings?  Although place and scale are important to social 
movement framing, we also need to understand how non-humans shape and condition these 
frames; urban lead contamination provides a particularly illuminating case to explore how the 
properties of non-humans can shape the dynamics of social movements.  Although many cities 
have recently experienced local social movements in response to lead contamination of urban 
water, including Flint, Michigan, this thesis contends that the dynamics at play in Milwaukee are 
distinct, and worthy of investigation for what they reveal about non-humans and social 
movement framing dynamics. 
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3 - BACKGROUND 
 
 
In order to better understand the dynamics of the current case study it is helpful to situate 
it within the context of urban lead, and social movements that have organized around its 
remediation. First, a brief examination of the history of lead regulation helps to reveal the 
differentiated approaches and the devolution of responsibility for mitigation strategies from the 
federal government to the individual, a trend which parallels the larger shift towards neoliberal 
governance, and which has significant implications for the activists in the current Milwaukee 
case.  This section also briefly explores the LSM dynamics in Flint, Michigan, and how that 
city’s experience with urban lead contamination has served as a resource for other mobilization 
efforts.  I then turn to Milwaukee — the following sections are devoted to the history of the 
city’s water supply, including the development of the city’s water works, its experience with 
cryptosporidium parvum in the 1990s and the subsequent efforts to reinvent the city as the 
‘Freshwater Capital of the World.’  The following sections examine the leniency of the EPA 
requirements for testing and managing urban lead levels, and how the current case of lead 
contamination and the revelations of Milwaukee’s lead laterals came to light.   
Before exploring the emergence of FLAC, I look briefly at Milwaukee’s history of lead 
abatement programs, including its lead paint abatement program.  Because lead laterals are not 
the only source of lead exposure, and the effects of lead exposure are compounded by other 
factors, this section helps to contextualize the risk factors — such as housing, and Milwaukee’s 
patterns of housing segregation and disinvestment — that make certain areas of the city ‘riskier’ 
for lead contamination than others.  Although this may seem to be tangential to the current case 
of lead contamination in water, it is central to the dynamics of FLAC’s framings, which seek to 
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highlight both the universal risk of the lead laterals and the differentiated risks of lead 
contamination.  The section concludes with a brief history of the group’s development, as well as 
a discussion of the recent political scandals which have lent more visibility and credibility to the 
FLAC’s efforts. 
 
3.1 Organizing around urban lead 
Lead poisoning has long been a public health concern, and federal regulations that have 
dramatically reduced exposure to lead in the United States in the 20th century should be lauded.  
However, an examination of the history of regulatory changes and organizing efforts around 
urban lead exposure reveals differential responses to the three primary forms of risk: the 
occupational risks posed to workers in lead-using industries; risks posed specifically to children, 
which have drawn the most medical and political attention; and environmental risks, which are 
seen as “universal” risks that have indiscriminate effects upon the population (Warren 2001).  
Although scholarship has been dedicated to distinguishing between the social conditions that 
drove responses to these three modes of exposure, little attention has been paid to the agential 
role of lead in shaping such differentiated responses. 
The majority of early regulation efforts focused on occupational hazards, demanding 
increased federal oversight of producers and employers to limit severe exposure in the workplace 
(Warren 2001, Rabin 2008).  As Warren’s (2001) comprehensive review of lead reform makes 
clear, these early efforts were focused on the clinical symptoms that resulted from severe levels 
of lead poisoning.  As medical research has advanced, regulation has instead been tied to 
quantitative measures — such as lead blood levels — rather than observable symptoms, 
reflecting a cultural aversion not only to the most dire consequences of lead exposure, but to any 
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form of preventable risk (Warren 2001).  This shift meant that regulation no longer targeted the 
most problematic and large-scale sources of lead exposure, such as the paint and gasoline 
industries, but was suddenly focused at the individual level of each child’s lead levels.  Federal 
funding has supported local governments and health care providers in assuming a large portion 
of responsibility for this more granular kind of regulation through subsidized lead abatement 
programs and childhood testing protocols, allowing them to assist families in identifying and 
remedying individual cases of lead exposure (Rabin 2008).  However, in an increasingly 
neoliberal context of decreased federal funding and devolved responsibility, families and 
individuals are expected to assume a far greater onus for averting these ‘preventable’ risks.  
Following Nikolas Rose (2001), we may see this a sort of pre-sickness, whereby individuals who 
are neither observably nor experientially ‘sick’ are nonetheless enjoined to adopt certain habits 
and precautions under the auspices of responsibility, in attempts to prevent an illness that may 
never arrive. 
This is further complicated by the inaccessibility of the technical knowledge which 
undergirds the definition of ‘risk’ as defined by policy and scientists.  As Ottinger (2018) tells us, 
science — by nature of its political authority and inherent value-system — limits the ability of 
non-scientists to participate in debate or knowledge construction.  This is particularly dangerous 
in cases pertaining to EJ issues, as the full scope of possible hazards can be obscured by the 
technical language and those most directly affected by environmental injustices — non-scientists 
— are unable to participate in decision making. 
Lead in drinking water has proven to be a particularly complex problem to identify and 
eradicate.  Although leaded gasoline was all but eliminated by 1988, and a 1978 ban prohibited 
use of lead as an additive in paint (Schmidt & Hall, 2016b), plumbing, one of the most common 
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sources of lead exposure, was not explicitly outlawed until 1986.  It was not until 1991 that the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Lead & Copper Rule (LCR) moved to regulate 
exposure to lead in drinking water (U.S. EPA, 1991).  Because lead pipes were widely used in 
the development of urban water systems through the United States in the late 1800s, regulation 
of lead levels in a city’s drinking water is a geographically intractable problem, requiring the 
management or replacement of a subterranean network of city-owned service lines combined 
with property-owned lines leading to myriad commercial and residential properties.  Further, any 
partial updates or replacements made to the lines may in fact result in higher levels of lead 
contamination, due to the disturbance caused to the corrosion during replacement (Trueman, 
Camara & Gagnon, 2016), a distinct phenomenon which has implications for the efficacy of 
frames which seek to address possible remediation. 
It is impossible to explore the unique difficulties of organizing around urban lead without 
consulting the example of Flint, Michigan, a widely publicized and politicized example of urban 
lead poisoning.  As Pulido (2016) notes, the case of Flint is significant not least because of the 
horrors inflicted upon Flint residents, but because it made visible the larger structural context 
within which ‘isolated’ incidents occur, which is so often invisible in instances of environmental 
racism.  The city decided in 2014 to switch its water supply to the Flint River as a cost-cutting 
measure, a water source so polluted and corrosive that it caused car parts in GM’s Flint factory to 
rust, to say nothing of the effects on Flint’s human residents (Pulido 2016).  Scholarship on the 
environmental racism experienced in Flint has done much to critically reveal the ways in which 
this incident is not incidental, but is in fact intrinsic to modern systems of governance (Pulido 
2016, Ranganathan 2016).  Following these analyses, racist intent is seen as an important driver 
but not the sole motivator; rather, these studies call our attention to racial liberalism and global 
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capitalism, the context within which black and brown bodies have been systematically devalued 
to create a “landscape of differential value which can be harnessed in diverse ways to facilitate 
the accumulation of more power and profit” (Pulido 2016, 1).  Social movement efforts to 
remediate and draw attention to Flint’s lead poisoning have similarly focused on the social 
conditions and racialized logic which facilitated the city’s decision to baldly prioritize the import 
of delivering water within a suitable budget over the potential, and as yet unproven, long term 
health effects for the individual.  For activists outside of the city, Flint has served as a 
galvanizing instance of environmental racism and municipal depravity, a resource that has been 
mobilized by other LSMs, including the Milwaukee activists. 
 
3.2 Developing Milwaukee’s water system 
Milwaukee established a Board of Water Commissioners in 1871, nearly three decades 
after the city’s incorporation.  The public had long been clamoring for a municipal water system; 
the population of the city already exceeded 100,000 and the human demands on the water supply 
were significant – and galling.  Absent a system for disposal, Milwaukee households disposed of 
their own garbage by leaving it the streets; the substantial runoff polluted the city’s groundwater 
to such an extent that “liquid filth” routinely came out of the water pumps (Leavitt 1996, Foss-
Mollan 2001).  In the early stages of the development of the water system, water was hardly 
considered to be a public right, a distinction which was reflected in both the plans for 
development and the techniques of funding.  The city began laying a distribution system of large 
water mains, to which pipes were laid and linked up to deliver water according to a 
“subscription” system, whereby neighborhoods (sometimes no more than one or more city 
blocks) would petition their ward supervisor or alderman for the water pipes, and would then set  
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Figure 1 — Diagram of water system and lead laterals 
Source: City of Milwaukee 
 
about raising the funds to pay for their installation (Foss-Mollan 2001).  Unsurprisingly, this 
system privileged both well-financed and well-connected Milwaukeeans who had the ear of their 
alderman, prioritizing the expansion of the water system in more desirable areas of the city.  
Though “subscriptions” were eventually superseded by a development plan driven more by 
efficiency than by selectivity, the legacy of subscriptions did not entirely disappear; certain 
wards on Milwaukee’s South side waited up to thirty years longer than other wards for city 
services (Foss-Mollan 2001). 
When development began on Milwaukee’s municipal water system in 1874, one-half-
inch lead pipes were used for the service lines (also known as laterals) to convey water from the 
mains in the street to a customer’s home (see Figure 1).  At the time, lead pipes were standard 
issue in the development of water systems across the United States in the 1800 and 1900s (Rabin 
2008).  Lead, often described as “the useful metal,” become a ubiquitous toxin during this time 
of widespread usage, and efforts to reduce or regulate lead exposure in the last century have had 
to balance its usefulness to producers and consumers with its potential dangers (Warren 2001).  
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The current scientific consensus is that there is no level at which lead is considered to be safe for 
humans and is particularly harmful for children, increasing risk of damage to the brain and 
nervous system, and possible impairment of their physical, learning and behavioral development 
(CDC, 2016).  Although concerns about the potential health effects of water run through lead 
pipes were raised as early as 1859, the engineering advantages of lead – more malleable, 
therefore easier to bend around existing infrastructure, and longer lasting at 35 years, as 
compared to 16 for iron – outweighed any nascent appreciation of the public health risk (Rabin 
2008).  When that calculus finally flipped in the mid-1900s, in spite of the valiant lobbying 
efforts of Lead Industries Association, state and local plumbing codes were revised ad hoc to 
limit the use of lead pipes in their water systems (Schmidt & Hall 2016b; Rabin 2008).  As a 
result of nearly a century of infrastructure development and differentiated responses across 
hundreds of local drinking water authorities, the EPA estimates that amongst the 52,000 drinking 
water systems across the country today, nearly 10 million lead service lines (LSL) are still in use 
(Smith 2015c).  Given the monumental cost and complexity of excavating and replacing all lead 
pipes across the country, Congress never mandated system-wide replacements; instead, 
guidelines were provided by the 1986 Congressional amendment to the Safe Drinking Water Act 
and augmented by the EPA’s 1991 Lead & Copper Rule (LCR) (40 C.F.R 141 § 1, 1991) to 
make each municipality responsible for monitoring and mitigating potential health risks for their 
respective populations.    
3.3 Cryptosporidium and back again 
By the 1990s, Milwaukee had developed its Water Works into an acclaimed water 
supply, consistently exceeding both EPA purity standards and the (stricter) Wisconsin 
Department of Natural Resources standards.  But in April 1993, Milwaukee experienced an 
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outbreak of cryptosporidium parvum, an oocyst capable of bypassing standard water treatment 
regimes which causes severe diarrheal illness, a shocking indictment of a water system that was, 
by all available metrics, a gold standard of water purity.  By the time the outbreak was under 
control, 400,000 Milwaukeeans had suffered gastrointestinal illness, and at least 69 people had 
died (Ceraso 2013).  Reflecting on the outbreak, former Milwaukee Water Works superintendent 
Carrie Lewis said that the extensive testing done today by MWW is the direct legacy of the 
outbreak, one which “made us realize that we were in the public health protection business” (qtd. 
in Ceraso 2013).  The cryptosporidium outbreak also left a direct legacy on the institutional 
operations of the Milwaukee Water Works, as well as on its public outreach, awareness and 
engagement strategies.  In the wake of the outbreak, MWW had declined to make any public 
comment for over a week (Foss-Mollan 2001), a decision which resulted in widespread panic 
and confusion.  MWW has since prioritized public comment, although it places significantly less 
emphasis on transparency — a strategy, activists contend, that is more concerned with managing 
a crisis of possible public anxiety than with managing real-life public health crises.  The fact that 
Milwaukee’s water could be fatal despite routinely testing so well informed a greater investment 
in an analysis of both the chemical composition of the water and a broadening of the potential 
scope of risk: while the majority of water systems test for only the standard EPA-regulated list 
(91 containments), Milwaukee Water Works tests for more than 500 chemicals annually and 
publicly posts the results (Ceraso 2013).  
These changes were part of Milwaukee’s broader reinvestment in its water management 
systems and technology following the outbreak, a campaign to rebuild public trust and draw 
investment by rebranding the city as the ‘Freshwater Capital of the World.’  With the help of 
massive private investment, Milwaukee sought to reinvent itself as a global destination for water 
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technology. The Water Council, a non-profit organization and investment hub was developed by 
Richard Meeusen in 2009 to “support economic growth in the region, attract new talent and 
develop the technology to solve the world's water problems” through partnerships with more 
than 180 businesses, government agencies and education programs (Muller 2013). The Water 
Council has since helped to draw more than $4 million in grants for job creation and research, 
and seems positioned to continue to draw even more human capital to the area: in 2014, 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, one of the Water Council’s partners, opened the School of 
Freshwater Sciences, a pioneering graduate program (Muller 2013).  With the 2015 revelations 
of widespread lead service laterals, Milwaukee’s sterling reputation as the Freshwater Capital of 
the World — and the considerable investments attached to it — are being challenged. 
 
 
Figure 2 — Water Council branding 
Source: TheWaterCouncil.com 
 
3.4 Testing urban lead levels 
In spite of the staggering number of lead service lines currently in use, more than 99% of 
the country’s drinking water systems, including Milwaukee, meet the federal requirements for 
safe lead levels in drinking water — or at least, they do on paper.  Federal regulations dictate the 
frequency of monitoring, the number of samples to be collected, a tiering system to determine 
the selection of sampling sites, and “action levels” of lead concentration.  However, although 
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there is no level at which lead is considered to be safe for humans, these regulations do not 
require that lead-compliant water systems will be lead-free or even lead-safe; rather, the water 
system is only considered ‘dangerous’ when more than 10 percent of sampled household taps 
exceed 15 parts of lead per billion (ppb).  Until ten percent of homes tested surpass this EPA-
mandated threshold, the entire populace is deemed to be lead-compliant — in fact, remediation is 
not required unless the ten percent threshold is met, even if nine percent of the homes sampled  
tested at exceedingly high levels.  In this calculus, homes within the sample that are ‘unsafe’ are 
a necessary, expected counterweight to the health of the system at large.  
In spite of the somewhat lenient federal regulations, municipal water departments have 
arrogated to themselves the task of managing the ‘safety’ of lead levels in their water supply by 
means of both manipulation and evasion.  A June 2016 study conducted by the Guardian 
concluded that water departments in thirty-three American cities and towns, including 
Milwaukee, had regularly employed testing methods that deliberately circumvented the US 
Environmental Protection Agency’s testing guidelines, resulting in lower detected levels of lead 
in households (Millman & Glenza 2016).  Milwaukee, along with twenty other cities, had 
instructed testers to ‘pre-flush’ the pipes before testing for lead, a tactic that helps clear lead 
particles from the plumbing before the sample is collected (Millman & Glenza 2016).   
 
3.5 Uncovering Milwaukee’s lead levels 
Despite these tactics, 2015 tests conclusively revealed lead levels of more than 100 parts 
per billion — nearly seven times the federal safety level — in 24 of Wisconsin’s 72 public 
county water systems (Schmidt & Hall 2016a).  These tests were compounded by a 2015 pilot 
study conducted by Milwaukee Water Works (MWW) when they began an accelerated water 
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main replacement program, and were intended to determine the effects of the replacement work 
on lead levels in nearby residences.  Partial line replacements have been shown to cause higher 
levels of lead contamination, as the disturbance caused by working on the line can dislodge 
corroded lead particles, sending them into residents’ water supply (Trueman et al. 2016).  The 
survey identified six residences affected by the water main replacement project and tested their 
tap water before replacement work began, the day following the replacement, and conducted a 
follow-up test four weeks later.  When the tests revealed elevated lead levels in all six homes 
immediately following the water main replacement (Stone 2016), MWW immediately suspended 
all ongoing and planned water main replacement projects where LSLs were present.  Although 
the City has since acknowledged that nearly 100,000 such lead pipes are still in use today (Figure 
3), their initial response was to distribute a letter to 70,000 ‘at-risk’ Milwaukee residences where 
the age of the home (built prior to 1951, the year the city discontinued the use of lead in 
plumbing materials) indicated that a LSL might be present.  The letter, a reassuring testament to 
the unassailable safety of Milwaukee’s water supply, noted in particular that “Lead is not found 
in Milwaukee’s source water, Lake Michigan, nor is lead in our treated drinking water.  Your 
water meets all federal guidelines for safety” (Appendix A).  Ironically, the letter also detailed 
“steps you can take to further reduce your risk of lead exposure,” among which were flushing — 
the very same technique the City had employed to avoid the detection of lead for EPA samples 
(Appendix A).   
 
3.6 Milwaukee: the segregated city 
Of course, lead laterals are not the only source of exposure to lead, and the City of 
Milwaukee has a strong history of lead abatement work, chiefly through its Childhood Lead 
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Figure 3 — Lead Service Line Distribution in the City of Milwaukee, 2016 
Source: City of Milwaukee.  Data Source: Milwaukee Water Works 
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Poisoning Primary Prevention Program.  Although the program is limited in scope and only 
focuses on mitigating lead exposure through paint chips on residential window sills it is, per the 
city’s website, ”a nationally recognized, award-winning program working to prevent lead 
exposure to children and provide comprehensive services to children and families” (City of 
Milwaukee).  The program provides grants to eligible property owners to replace old windows 
that may contain lead-based paint; as of December 2016, the program has certified 17,785 
housing units as “lead-paint safe,” although the program only provides subsidies for low-income 
residents with children living in six of the city’s ZIP codes on the North Side: 53206, 53208, 
53209, 53210, 53212 and 53216 (City of Milwaukee).  The ease with which the city can 
explicitly connect income level to geography is the direct result of the oft-cited and much-studied 
persistence of socioeconomic inequality and racial discrimination in 21st century Milwaukee, 
which has left the city with a housing supply that inequitably distributes lead risk and lead 
exposure. 
 Milwaukee’s current patterns of segregations are due in no small part to the city’s legacy 
of redlining in the 1930s, and the racially-motivated policies and politics which continue to 
maintain these patterns of segregation today.  Initially, Milwaukee’s housing stock and 
demographic patterns developed for many decades in patterns familiar to many early urban 
theories: laborers and recent immigrants lived close to the factories in the downtown area.  Many 
eventually moved “up and out” into what can be considered first-ring suburbs, where through ad 
hoc modifications and renovation projects, homeowners managed to accommodate growing 
families or supplement their income with rent from tenants (Simon 1996).  The suburbanization 
of Milwaukee was facilitated by subdivision, streetcar extension, and the desires of wealthier 
middle-class residents to self-segregate from newer, lower status immigrants, ‘escaping’ 
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congested urban centers for the more ‘idyllic’ wards on the periphery of the urban core (Simon 
1996).  During the Great Migration, subsequent waves of African American migrants were 
confined in their housing options to certain neighborhoods, a racialized effect seen in urban 
centers across the country as a result of the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) maps, 
redlining practices that rated the “desirability” of urban areas for investment opportunities, and 
the predatory practices of unscrupulous real-estate brokers (Jackson 1985, Coates 2014). While 
the notion that a city’s built environment will develop unevenly can hardly be considered a novel 
concept (Harvey 1989; Smith 1984), the initial inequity of Milwaukee’s housing market was 
further exacerbated by myriad factors: the concentrated segregation it produced; the decline of 
manufacturing; economic restructuring; White flight; suburbanization; and the recent US housing 
crisis, to name a few (Bonds, Kenny & Wolfe 2014). 
As a result of these historical factors, Milwaukee’s uneven development has contributed 
to a dramatically differentiated and racialized housing market.  Squires et al. (1991) show that in 
Milwaukee neighborhoods where non-Whites account for 24% or more of the population, almost 
half of the housing stock was built prior to 1940; for areas where Whites make up 24% or more 
of the population, almost 70% of the housing stock was built after 1940.  As this thesis will 
explore, the risk associated with the LSLs is not distributed uniformly throughout the city, even 
if the LSLs themselves were once uniformly dispersed amongst the most central and 
(contemporaneously) populous districts.  Rather, because residential lead exposure comes from 
paint, soil (as a result of paint dust) and water, patterns of disinvestment means older homes in 
certain areas of the city have been left with their original — and risky — lead paint and 
plumbing, posing a significantly higher risk to their inhabitants. 
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3.7 FLAC: The Freshwater for Life Action Coalition 
Following the distribution of the 2016 MWW letter, news of the 70,000 LSLs was 
minimally publicized, garnering a subdued public reaction; among those who were made aware 
was Robert Miranda, a longtime Milwaukee community organizer and political strategist.  
Miranda found the city’s response to be insufficient and misleading, by minimizing the dangers 
posed to residents and the spatial magnitude of the problem.  Miranda enlisted other community 
members to develop an advocacy group, the Freshwater for Life Action Coalition (FLAC), and 
turned to Drs. Yanna Lambrinidou and Mark Edwards, scientists who had played pivotal roles in 
the lead organizing efforts in Washington, DC and Flint, respectively, for scientific expertise 
with which to combat the city’s official contentions that the water was safe.  Since its 2016 
inception, FLAC has devoted its efforts to agitating for legislative change and aggressively 
disseminating public information in a direct challenge to the city through press releases, press 
conferences, community events and public protests.  From the outset, FLAC’s core demand has 
been consistent, even as the group has adjusted to accommodate shifting political realities: the 
city must remove all of the lead laterals, and must do so at no cost to homeowners.   
In response to increasing public awareness and anxiety, the Common Council established 
a Water Quality Task Force (WQTF) in July 2016, comprised of members of the Common 
Council, Department of Public Works, Health Department, the community, and the medical 
profession.  For two years, the WQTF served as both the public face of the city’s efforts to 
remediate the issue and the most readily available platform for community members, local 
businesses and activists to challenge the city’s response to the issue.  The WQTF oversaw the 
unveiling of the City’s “Lead Awareness Campaign” (see Section 5.4 for further discussion) and 
sponsored Ordinance 160742, passed by the Common Council in December 2016.  The 
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ordinance ensures that LSLs will be replaced if they are discovered in the course of regular main 
replacement work, but does not include plans for expedited replacement, meaning full 
remediation under the ordinance could take up to 150 years. 
 
3.8 Scandal and visibility 
The greatest boon to the group’s organizing may have come in January 2018, when 
Health Commissioner Bevan Baker abruptly resigned amidst allegations that the Milwaukee 
Health Department (MHD) had failed to notify thousands of Milwaukee families about their 
children’s high blood lead levels (Jannene 2018).  FLAC’s main challenges have been 
overcoming Milwaukeeans’ unfamiliarity with the issue of LSLs and their unwillingness to 
believe there is any danger — an unwillingness, this paper contends, that stems in part from the 
unique attributes of lead.  However, the public scandal in January brought widespread news 
coverage of Milwaukee’s LSLs, along with unfolding revelations of wrongdoing and 
mismanagement within the Milwaukee Health Department (MHD).  With this coverage came the 
revelation that Milwaukee’s lead situation might not, in fact, be as under control as city officials 
had previously led residents to believe; between 2015 and 2017, MHD tested 75,000 children for 
lead exposure as part of the city’s Lead Poisoning Prevention Program, and although 320 
children tested at higher than ‘normal’ or even ‘severe’ lead levels, nearly 120 of the affected 
families never received the required notification or home visit to remove potential sources of 
lead exposure.  Of the nearly 6,000 children whose blood tested at ‘low’ lead levels, only 1,500 
letters were sent to alert the affected families (Delong & Spencer 2018).  News of these failures 
has mobilized more Milwaukee residents to join with FLAC; more than 75 community members 
attended a February 14th protest at City to demand change from elected officials, and FLAC’s 
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list of coalition partners has grown significantly.  The coalition now includes groups from across 
the city: Milwaukee’s Democratic Socialists of America (DSA); the Greater Milwaukee Green 
Party; the Party for Socialism and Liberation; the Interfaith Conference of Greater Milwaukee; 
the International Socialists Organization; the Wisconsin Poor People’s Campaign; the Original 
Black Panthers of Milwaukee; Wisconsin Industrial Workers of the World, and more. 
Baker’s departure seems to represent a pivotal moment for the Milwaukee organizers; not 
only has it brought unprecedented attention to the issue, it has created a unique political 
opportunity.  After the Common Council rejected Mayor Barrett’s nominee for Interim Director, 
former MHD commissioner Paul Nannis, they nominated Patricia McManus, a longtime 
community advocate and President/CEO of the Black Health Coalition of Wisconsin.  For many 
organizers, McManus represents the possibility of an ‘inside man,’ an advocate within MHD 
who will work towards greater transparency and be a potential partner as FLAC pursues 
legislation to remediate the LSLs.  To a certain extent, this political upheaval has created a 
tipping point in the organizing which is beyond the scope of this paper — it remains to be seen if 
Baker’s departure, increased media coverage and McManus’ appointment will together create the 
conditions for FLAC to succeed in mobilizing residents and holding government accountable.  
However, I believe that the conditions that led to this point are still worthy of our attention, as 
they reveal the compromises, challenges and successes a local group of organizers have faced in 
attempting to make an invisible issue not only visible but motivating through the use of 
collective-action frames.  
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4 - METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In the theoretical framework and background sections, I have identified some important 
gaps that must be addressed in the unique case of framing Milwaukee’s urban lead 
contamination; specifically, the unacknowledged role of non-humans and the dynamics of risk 
and responsibility.  This research endeavors to ask which framings have been employed by social 
movement actors in the current case in Milwaukee, and what challenges have they faced.  In 
order to answer these research questions, this study relies on qualitative methods, using a variety 
of data sources and gathering methods, including qualitative data collected between November 
2016 and April 2018 as a participant observer, discourse analysis of FLAC materials and in-
depth interviews with organizers.  Because the group’s framing has necessarily evolved over 
time to account for changes in the political opportunity structure and the visibility of the group’s 
efforts, these qualitative methods allowed me to not only engage with the breadth of the framings 
employed over the length of the study, but also to speak with organizers to uncover the intentions 
and interpretations behind different framings and tactics the group employed.  In order to more 
closely interrogate this study’s research questions, which ask how external factors have shaped a 
LSM’s efforts, in-depth interviews and participant observation were necessary to supplement 
findings drawn from coding analysis, providing insight as to the motivations behind certain 
framings.  
Over the course of a year and half, I attended Water Quality Task Force (WQTF) 
meetings, community-organized informational events, an activist-organized protest, Milwaukee 
Common Council meetings, organizer strategizing meetings, and a community information 
session organized by 16th Street Community Health Centers (hereafter referred to as SSCHC).  
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My personal observations of interactions between organizers and activists, City employees, 
elected officials and members of the community contributes greatly to this study’s understanding 
of the discourses and rhetoric employed in the course of the evolution of framing the issue of 
Milwaukee’s lead laterals.  As an overt participant-observer of events and meetings, I was often 
taking notes and recording presentations; in this capacity, I was recognizable as a student 
researcher, and freely introduced myself as one, which allowed me to both capture the official 
remarks and engage with other attendees.   
In this way, I was able to recruit organizers and activists to participate as potential 
interviewees, from which a large portion of my research findings were drawn (for a full list of 
interview participants, see Appendix B).  I conducted nine open-ended, semi-structured 
interviews using a set of questions (see Appendix C) that served as a basis for my conversations; 
subsequent lines of questioning were drawn determined by interviewees’ responses, expertise 
and interests.  I conducted three separate, formal interviews with FLAC founder and 
spokesperson, Robert Miranda, as well as with two FLAC organizers, two City officials, two 
community organizers and leaders of two of FLAC’s partner organizations.  Although all were 
welcome to participate, interviewees were ultimately identified based on their proximity to the 
efforts of activists and organizers and their ability to speak authoritatively on behalf of the group 
they represented.  Having regularly attended WQTF and community meetings, it was relatively 
simple to identify the activists and organizers who were core members of FLAC and FLAC 
partner organizations efforts and to approach them personally and ask them if they would be 
willing to participate in my research.  Although all interviewees were able to speak on behalf of 
the group(s) they represented by nature of their position, interviewees were made expressly 
aware that they were only expected to speak for themselves as individuals, and to reflect their 
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own personal interpretations of events and actions and were not expected to speak as 
representatives of a particular group or organization. 
Although I conducted formal interviews, both over the phone and in-person, many of the 
statements made by the persons interviewed for this research were either echoed or expanded 
upon in the numerous organizing meetings and community events I attended.  The analysis in 
this thesis, therefore, is drawn from a combination of statements made within the context of an 
interview (for which I am able to provide quotes, which appear through the thesis) and 
statements made in the context of organizer meetings or community events, for which I rely on 
my own notes and interview participants’ recollections.  
For the purposes of this research, I secured IRB approval by describing the scope, 
significance and data collection methods for the project, and providing sample consent forms and 
interview questions (Appendix C).  Pursuant to my IRB approval, participants were able to 
consent to having their names included with this research; although several interviewees did 
consent to having their identities included, I decided to obscure the identities of all participants, 
by replacing names with job roles or connection to FLAC (e.g. FLAC organizer).  
The one notable exception to this is Robert Miranda, who is the founder, lead organizer 
and spokesperson for FLAC.  Miranda — who has consented to the use of his real name — has 
been the driving force behind FLAC’s organizing, and is inseparable from the group’s efforts.  
Indeed, he was referenced by name in nearly every interview I conducted, and I myself 
interviewed him on three separate occasions over the course of my research.  Because of how 
central and vital Miranda is to FLAC’s efforts and to this research, this thesis relies heavily upon 
these interviews I conducted with him, and press materials he has written for the group.  His 
words appear most frequently in this paper, which is as it should be: to a certain extent, Robert 
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Miranda is FLAC, and any analysis of FLAC’s efforts is an examination of Miranda’s efforts.  
As one organizer put it, “what got us here to begin with when it wasn't an issue to almost anyone 
was Robert [Miranda]. Someone who cared enough to carry that when no one else was really 
carrying it. And that is difficult, that takes a special kind of person” (FLAC organizer).  For all of 
these reasons, and given his explicit consent, it was clear that a pseudonym would a pseudonym 
be insufficient to disguise his identity.  
All interviews were recorded, transcribed and inductively coded; after a preliminary re-
reading of the transcripts, I identified initial themes and categories within and among each 
interviews, with particular attention given to words or statements indicative of framings, 
responsibility, culpability, and rationale, of which four main themes emerged: (i) the City of 
Milwaukee is untrustworthy, or is more concerned with protecting its own interests; (ii) the 
community is insufficiently aware of the issue; (iii) segregation produces uneven effects; and (iv) 
the City’s current response has been insufficient.  After coding the interviews using these 
themes, several of the obstacles faced by FLAC’s organizers did not seem to be particularly well 
articulated by the existing labels, and so additional categories were created: (v) residents’ 
responsibilities in mitigating risk; and (vi) the uniqueness of lead. 
The findings drawn from interviews and participant observation were supplemented by a 
discourse analysis of publicly available information, including public Facebook posts by FLAC 
organizers and FLAC-organized Facebook events (the group’s primary method of organizing and 
community outreach); FLAC press releases and interviews, drawn from KINGFISHmke.com 
(one of FLAC’s partners) and other media outlets; and official government documents, such as 
inter-departmental correspondence and public memorandums. In addition, this research benefited 
greatly from analysis of data drawn from a rank-order survey conducted by 16th Street 
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Community Health Centers (SSCHC) at two lead education events held in 2018.  The survey was 
designed and distributed by SSCHC, who compiled the results in a spreadsheet, which they 
generously shared with me for the purpose of this study.  Statistical data was drawn from the 
City of Milwaukee’s public-facing data tool, the ‘Online Aldermanic District Statistics.’  All 
other figures in this study, including maps, are publicly-available figures developed by the City 
of Milwaukee and the Milwaukee Health Department, as noted. 
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5 - FINDINGS 
 
 
In the following sections, I will explore FLAC’s organizing history and identify some of 
the external factors that shaped the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framings the group 
employed.  In doing so, I seek to answer how FLAC organized in the absence of a crisis — or, to 
put it another way, by what tactics the group managed to bring an otherwise invisible crisis to the 
fore of Milwaukee’s public and political agenda.  Although this thesis highlights some of the 
substantial successes of FLAC’s organizing efforts, I also argue that some of the complications 
of the group’s initial framing — focused on both government malfeasance and the presence of a 
public health crisis — led to an ambiguous and bifurcated response by elected officials, the 
public, and non-profit organizations.  Resources and attention have subsequently been divided 
between addressing potential long-term solutions, a job which is necessarily relegated to elected 
officials, and addressing the health risks associated with LSLs, which has largely been left to 
non-profit organizations and residents.  To be clear, this is not an attempt to argue that FLAC’s 
framing has in some way failed to succeed in holding government accountable, or that the group 
is responsible for the complex and inadequate current municipal response to the LSLs; rather, I 
argue that several distinctive properties of lead and of Milwaukee’s lead laterals directly 
contribute to perception of the risks associated with LSLs and attendant interpretations of 
culpability and responsibility.  
 I begin by revisiting FLAC’s earliest and most consistent framing, that Milwaukee’s lead 
laterals posed a compelling public health risk, and the government was intentionally misleading 
residents as to the extent of the issue.  I then explore the effects of the lack of publicly available 
information, and how this both supported FLAC’s diagnostic and motivational frames and 
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similarly created an opportunity to educate and mobilize residents.  The following section 
explores in detail how LSLs and lead poisoning risks are unevenly distributed throughout 
Milwaukee; although this is, to a certain extent, an issue that affects all of Milwaukee, it 
disproportionately affects certain neighborhoods and demographic groups.  In this section, I 
explore the related implications for residents, organizers and elected officials.  I follow with an 
analysis of some of the city’s responses to FLAC’s organizing, and the ways in which they are 
not only insufficient to address the magnitude of problem, but further relegate responsibility to 
residents and non-profit organizations.  I conclude with a discussion of non-humans — lead itself 
— to ask in what ways the unique properties of the laterals contributed to FLAC’s framings and 
organizing efforts or shaped the context within which they sought to mobilize residents. 
 
5.1 Truth Will Out: Diagnostic Framings at FLAC’s inception 
When Robert Miranda first began sharing information about Milwaukee’s lead laterals, 
he undertook what may be described as a one-man social media campaign to educate the public 
on the issue of lead laterals, an issue he felt had been intentionally concealed.  Reflecting on 
what initially compelled him to begin organizing, Miranda explains:  
I followed what happened in Washington DC, and then I followed what happened 
in Flint. And then I heard Milwaukee, the way they were talking, and I thought to 
myself there’s something wrong here, when the Commissioner of the Department 
of Health is interviewed on CBS 58 and he audacitly [sic] says on TV in public 
‘no lead comes out of the tap water’ and I knew that was wrong. So I said, I think 
I better organize because people are buying this nonsense that our water’s 
completely safe, and I knew that not to be an accurate statement (R. Miranda, 
personal interview). 
 
Drawing a direct line from two of the most recent fatal and near-fatal widely publicized lead 
crises in the United States, Flint, MI and Washington, DC, Miranda felt there was enough of a  
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Table 2 — Elements of FLAC framings 
Diagnostic Prognostic Motivational 
We have 70,000 homes in Milwaukee 
with lead pipes and there are over 
100,000 homes in Wisconsin with lead 
pipes passing on lead contaminated 
water. (Miranda, 2016). 
--- 
Neither the Mayor nor the Common 
Council are moving with the urgency 
that this health crisis deserves (FLAC, 
2018a) 
--- 
“There has been a deliberate attempt to 
mislead, misinform, misdirect the 
public on the issue of lead water in the 
city of Milwaukee.” (R. Miranda, 
personal interview) 
--- 
The City of Milwaukee cannot be 
considered the "Freshwater Capitol of 
the World" or the "Fresh Coast City", if 
they will not provide lead-free drinking 
water to the people that live in its own 
backyard. (Goodson, 2016)  
--- 
Mayor Barrett, his bureaucrats and his 
surrogates should be ashamed of 
themselves. Years of inactivity and 
failed policy which should have been 
established to protect the public health 
over the past decade has resulted 
homeowners and residents with half 
measures [...] (Johnson & Miranda, 
2016a) 
“Remove the lead pipes. There is 
no other alternative to eradicating 
lead in water, it’s just to remove 
the lead pipes. Our purpose is to 
push the government to prioritize, 
to send resources towards 
removing lead pipes, but before 
doing that we also have demanded 
that the mayor and the bureaucracy 
at city put together a 
comprehensive strategic plan on 
how to do this.” (R. Miranda, 
personal interview) 
--- 
Demand: for the City to develop a 
comprehensive plan for lead 
removal and mitigation (pipes and 
paint). This plan must not burden 
home owners and renters with 
implementation costs, it must 
continually provide water filters to 
affected residences, and must 
include the complete removal of all 
lead laterals in the City within a 
generation. (FLAC, 2018b) 
 
Homeowners have paid enough. 
Tens of thousands of Milwaukee 
residents drinking water 
contaminated by lead lateral pipes 
has cost this community in failing 
schools, increased violent crime in 
our streets and high infant 
mortality. Enough is enough 
already! (Johnson & Miranda, 
2016b) 
--- 
All Mayor Barrett wants to do is 
give us filters (which they only 
have 2,000 to provide to over 
70,000 homes and that do not 
eliminate all of the lead from the 
drinking water) and have 
homeowners and residents pay part 
of the lead service line 
replacement. Homeowners and 
residents paying for lead service 
lines replacement? We say no! 
(Johnson & Miranda,2016a) 
--- 
“Our government hasn’t been very 
straightforward with us, just like 
their [Flint’s] government hasn’t 
been very straightforward with 
them.” (R. Miranda, personal 
interview) 
Note: Sources cited here are fully listed in the references section unless excepts are from personal interviews (denoted by 
quotation marks).  
 
parallel to be concerned that Milwaukeeans were being intentionally misled by their elected 
officials, and as a result of this misinformation were too unaware of their predicament and its 
potential dangers to demand any change from their leaders.  This first, crucial diagnostic framing 
— that Milwaukee city government was misrepresenting the truth to its residents — has 
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remained consistent throughout FLAC’s years of organizing, and has played a critical role in 
developing motivational frames that urge Milwaukeeans to challenge official narratives and 
educate themselves.  In this initial and crucial iteration, Miranda was flexing the classic 
transformative function of a frame (Snow 2013) by helping to reconstitute the ways in which 
Milwaukeeans saw both their pipes and their elected officials, and focusing the relationship 
between the two as a mobilizing grievance.  And yet, in this first frame and in FLAC’s continued 
organizing, the emphasis is divided between the harm done to residents by the lead laterals and 
the harm done to residents by their potential untrustworthy elected officials, with the emphasis 
weighted towards the latter.   
 It is worth noting that although the framings employed by FLAC out the outset have been 
consistent over their years of organizing, these are not the only framings the group could have 
pursued.  For example, although FLAC has identified Milwaukee’s city government as solely 
responsible for remediating the city’s lead laterals, the activists could instead have identified 
property owners and negligent landlords as antagonists.  Because lead exposure is so closely tied 
to the age and quality of housing stock, these actors could wield immense power in mitigating 
the incidences of lead exposure for many low-income Milwaukeeans.  And, in an increasingly 
neoliberal context that favors market solutions and individuated responsibility, landlords and 
property owners would perhaps make a more easily obtainable target for FLAC’s organizing 
efforts. However, the group’s diagnostic framings have unequivocally held government 
responsible.  This framing seems to recognize a decision on FLAC’s part to prioritize their 
principle of universal removal of the lead pipes over expediency or short-term feasibility, a 
willingness to focus explicitly on comprehensive remediation and the spatial and political 
breadth of the issue, rather than on smaller and more achievable goals.  (These tensions, between 
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short-term ‘achievable’ goals and long term ‘comprehensive’ solutions are explored in greater 
detail in subsequent sections.)  The group’s chosen framing also emphasizes universal 
government responsibility over individuated, neoliberal solutions and the inherent inequalities of 
access, such as concerns that without effective government oversight, negligent landlords would 
not be compelled to action (see section 5.4 for more discussion).  By choosing to pursue a 
framing which holds government solely accountable, FLAC therefore committed itself to the 
principle that “homeowners have paid enough” (Johnson & Miranda, 2016b), advocating on 
behalf of all affected residents — even those who are financially capable of mitigating the risks 
posed by lead laterals with no government support —for a comprehensive solution, rather than a 
piecemeal response by homeowners.     
It is helpful to note that, although largely driven by Robert Miranda, FLAC’s 
mobilization frames are not simply Miranda’s personal interpretations.  The concept of 
“framing” exists in contrast to the psychological concept of “schema,” in that frames do not 
merely reflect individual attitudes, but rather are reflective of the process of reality construction, 
or the negotiation of shared meaning amongst multiple actors (Gamson 1992).  FLAC, since its 
earliest inception, has always been a collaborative efforts; convinced that the public was being 
misled, Miranda asked a number of groups to join him in forming a coalition, including the 
NAACP of Milwaukee, WISDOM (a statewide network of faith communities in Wisconsin), the 
Black Health Coalition of Wisconsin and a number of local community organizers and activists:  
We all came together, we met, I gave my presentation as to what I felt were 
misleading statements, not totally accurate statement.  They, being [of] sound 
mind, very astute people, researched what I had to say, we came back together, 
and we formed an alliance coalition (R. Miranda, personal interview). 
 
When the group held their first press conference in March 2016, the motivational framing they 
had collectively produced was a direct challenge to the City on two counts, disputing their 
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official stance on a possible public health crisis by “calling attention and questioning the city’s 
position about our water being totally safe” (R. Miranda, phone interview) and calling into 
question their political priorities: “the mayor is worried about building his Camelot downtown 
while residents across the rest of the city are being exposed to lead-contaminated water” (R. 
Miranda, qtd. in Mendez 2016).  Therefore, although the initial framing undoubtedly reflects 
Miranda’s own “schema,” it similarly reflects the collective efforts of FLAC’s initial coalition 
members, and their strategic reality construction.  This fulfills Benford and Snow’s requirements 
that acts of framing constitute “an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and 
contention at the level of reality construction” (Benford & Snow 2000, 614). By employing a 
framing that focused the attention of Milwaukee residents on something that appeared not to 
exist, FLAC challenged both the lack of public information and the government’s equivocal 
acknowledgment, and sought to explicitly frame the issue as one of government malfeasance, 
deceit and neglect. 
Although it is not unusual for a diagnostic frame to contain multiple elements or foci, we 
may ask whether this initial framing, which articulated the problem as both a crisis of 
government malfeasance and a potential public health crisis, created a space for ambiguity in the 
future construction of and response to both prognostic and motivational framing.  In the 
following months and years, a tension would emerge between organizers and elected officials’ 
efforts to address both elements of the initial diagnostic framing; when resources were devoted to 
focusing on government malfeasance, FLAC would find there was insufficient attention paid to 
how to redress a public health crisis, and vice versa.  Recognizing the complex ways in which 
these two elements are connected has been crucial to much of the organizing in Milwaukee, but 
once they become articulated as separate issues, they necessitate separate prognostic frames with 
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attendant solutions and funding demands.  In what ways, then, is this diagnostic framing 
somewhat at odds with itself?  Given the bifurcated nature of FLAC’s initial framing, there is a 
reason to be concerned that a prognostic or motivational frame designed to address government 
malfeasance would be at odds with or compromise the efficacy of prognostic and motivational 
frames which hold the government exclusively responsible for addressing the health crisis of 
lead laterals.  Further, because the range of possible solutions for any given problem are 
inextricably tied to — and necessarily determined by — how the problem is named, prognostic 
and motivational frames and the actions that may result from them are necessarily affected by the 
diagnostic framing. 
The first component of the diagnostic framing, that the city was shirking its 
responsibilities and masking the seriousness of the threat posed to Milwaukeeans, persistently 
and effectively positioned FLAC as the truth-tellers at odds with elected officials.  This allowed 
activists to articulate a clear adversary: the hegemonic bureaucracy of city government, eager to 
cover up its misdeeds.  One organizer emphasized the “factions” formed by such a framing: 
There's a side that's with the mayor and whatever the mayor's proposing, and I 
know the mayor's not telling the truth because I know the science. But on the 
other hand, there's folks out here like FLAC, there's other organizations trying to 
get the word out (FLAC organizer, personal interview). 
 
Although starkly dramatic, this framing was received rather nonchalantly, even by those 
Milwaukeeans who might not consider themselves to be particularly radical; as one organizer 
explained to me, “I don't think that the city is evil, I'm not an anti-government type, but I think if 
you can cover your backside, you do, and I think there's been plenty of that” (Local organizer, 
personal interview).  The fact this expressly divisive framing was entirely logical for many 
residents in some ways points as much to pre-existing tensions between citizens and their elected 
officials as it does to a tacit acknowledgment of the supposed nature of politics; the notion that, 
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as this same organizer expressed, “people who had a reason for it to look better than it did 
wanted to say ‘oh it's fine, it’s not a big deal’ or ‘oh we’ve got it’ or ‘you guys are overreacting’ 
and lots of that diversionary kind of thing” (Local organizer, personal interview).  By focusing 
explicitly on the perceived deceptions of city government and their unwillingness to remedy (or 
even recognize) the issue, FLAC was in many ways prescient; the subsequent dismissal of 
Milwaukee Health Commissioner Bevan Baker would later serve as a motivating event for many 
Milwaukeeans to take seriously the possibility that FLAC had been vocalizing for months: that 
not only was there an issue, but that city government had also been complicit in keeping 
residents uninformed.   
For FLAC’s diagnostic framing to be successful, Milwaukeeans would need to believe 
that elected officials had something to protect — a compelling reason to lie or withhold 
information.  FLAC organizers and other partner organizations have made clear that they feel 
that the city’s reputation as the ‘Freshwater Capital of the World’ has played a role in its 
dismissals of FLAC’s early diagnostic framings.  As the director of one of FLAC’s partner 
organizations sees it, the city — and other groups who might stand to benefit from this 
‘Freshwater’ reputation — have not done enough to support FLAC’s efforts: 
Those ‘freshwater’ people get kind of mad about all this lead talk.  You know, we 
have UWM School of Freshwater Sciences that hasn’t said a peep about the 
problem! We also have the Medical College of Wisconsin, they’re just sitting on 
uh, a $44 million endowment and refuses to get involved in the problem.  There 
are a lot of institutions that just wanna, sort of look the other way ‘cause this is an 
uncomfortable topic to discuss (Director of FLAC partner organization, phone 
interview). 
 
Although many professionals within these institutions have spoken out against contaminants in 
Milwaukee’s water supply, FLAC and other organizers have interpreted a nearly universal lack 
of institutional support for their campaign.  This perspective reinforces any lack of government 
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transparency as motivated, in part, by a desire to protect the City’s reputation as not simply 
competent, but exceptional in regards to its water technology.  As a longtime community 
advocate put it, “politicians like to look at their legacy, and there’s a couple legacies certainly 
Mayor Barrett wants, and that’s one of [them], to have established this whole ‘Worldwide 
Freshwater’ piece” (Community advocate, phone interview).  
FLAC interprets the city’s continual emphasis on the purity of Milwaukee’s water supply 
and the city’s water technology as an intentional attempt to misdirect from the issue of the LSLs.  
From the outset — beginning with the letter sent to 70,000 at-risk residents — elected officials, 
Milwaukee Water Works (MWW) and the city’s Health Department (MHD) have emphatically 
assured residents that Milwaukee has a superlative water supply in Lake Michigan and state-of-
the-art water technology treatment standards: 
Our [FLAC’s] focus has been always the lead laterals, that's the lead lines that 
connect from the main to inside the house. The mayor — and he just recently did 
this again — the way he confuses people is by saying that there is no lead in our 
water mains. And nobody has ever talked about the water mains, we've never 
brought up the water mains, it's always been about the lead laterals. And so when 
people who are not very well versed about these lines, [who] don't understand the 
issue, when they hear him say that and then they ask around and they look into it, 
they'll look and see ‘yeah, well there is no lead in the main. It's all, yeah it's true.’ 
So they're not really looking into the issue of the lead laterals, which he [Barrett] 
personally got them to do by his misleading statements like that. (R. Miranda, 
phone interview) 
 
For residents with little familiarity with the issue as framed by FLAC or the science behind lead 
poisoning, the city’s statements have continued to seem sufficiently credible to mitigate the need 
for any public outcry or action.  FLAC’s contention that the city is working to protect its hard-
won and lucrative reputation as a global water-technology city, together with a lack of publicly 
available information, has hindered FLAC’s efforts to mobilize the public around a framing of 
government malfeasance. 
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Because lateral lines are partially city-owned and partially resident-owned, the emphasis 
given to the physical location of the “safe” water itself seems to further imply that the issue of 
lead is located within pipes legally owned by Milwaukee residents, rather than those owned by 
MWW.  In spite of the fact that MWW and the City of Milwaukee are solely responsible for 
ensuring the safety of the water that physically arrives in a property owner’s home (indeed, EPA 
testing samples for which MWW is held accountable are collected from residents’ faucets) the 
physical division of the main line is the means by which the city has sought to renounce its 
obligation to maintain, thereby enjoining property owners to assume responsibility to remediate 
the risks.  The city purports that it is this last, shortest leg of the water’s journey which makes 
residents responsible for the relative ‘safety’ of their drinking water, though the resident neither 
planned, constructed nor maintained any aspect of the system of water delivery. 
Only since Bevan Baker’s dismissal and the subsequent disclosures of previously 
unreleased data have organizers noticed less public resistance to their framing, as events have 
contradicted Milwaukee’s status as the capable and adept “freshwater capital.”  As Robert 
Miranda explained a month after Baker’s departure, there was a noticeable shift in public 
perception: 
Right now, there is a sense of anger that's starting to permeate around the 
community.  I think that what happened at the Milwaukee Health Department was 
a major wake-up call for people. You know, people are... three years of not 
informing people of the lead blood levels... I mean, people don't see that as an 
accident, they see that as deliberate [...] This is talk that's going on in the 
community now. And I'm not gonna be one to say ‘no that's not the case,’ I'm 
gonna be out there saying, you know, you have every right and every reason to 
believe that (R. Miranda, phone interview). 
 
The scandal at the Health Department dramatically shifted the political opportunity structure for 
FLAC, drawing attention to the lack of public information and casting aspersions on the 
government’s trustworthiness.  Since the revelations that the government had withheld critical 
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information about children’s blood lead levels, failing to alert thousands of families that their 
children had tested at ‘low’ or even ‘severe’ levels, residents were more willing to accept 
FLAC’s framings and question the city’s reputation as a skilled and reliable administrator of 
public health, the ‘Freshwater Capital’ of the world.  Further, given how much information had 
been withheld, the scandal called attention to how little information on the issue of LSLs was 
publicly available. 
 
5.2 A critical lack of awareness 
FLAC’s early diagnostic framing asserted that not only did Milwaukee have a potential 
health crisis on its hands, but that elected officials were hindering efforts to designate it as such; 
critical to both elements of this framing, and to related motivational framings, was the lack of 
publicly available information.  On the one hand, the lack of information supported FLAC’s 
diagnostic framing that government was withholding information to serve its own interests; on 
the other hand, it also hindered potential mobilization and activation of the public by reinforcing 
the idea that municipal services were functioning properly.  FLAC would continue to struggle 
against this obstacle until upheavals in government staffing would begin to change the public 
perception that, as one organizer put it, something about the situation “just doesn't pass a smell 
test” (FLAC organizer, personal interview).  However, this same lack of public information 
relating to lead laterals and their potential dangers also created an opening for organizers: to 
stage their own information campaign on these topics and mobilize residents.  When Robert 
Miranda began organizing, he notes that he “didn't take a more conventional organizing that 
we've seen in the past,” and instead used Facebook and other platforms to “invite interest of 
people and basically give knowledge to them through that venue before I started organizing the 
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town hall meetings” (R. Miranda, personal interview).  By providing information directly to the 
community and acting as a corrective to the lack of information — or intentional misinformation 
— provided by public officials, this organizing effort further problematized and politicized the 
lack of public awareness that necessitates such an informational campaign.   
The explicit implication in FLAC’s campaign, that the lack of public awareness is by 
design, questions not only the veracity of public officials’ statements but also the role these 
officials may have played in intentionally keeping such a public health crisis from garnering 
attention.  FLAC’s diagnostic and motivational framing around the lack of public information 
alleges that this was a condition elected officials both benefited from and actively sought to 
ensure, a calculated effort to keep residents in the dark as to the issue’s very existence.  Miranda 
explained: 
In the beginning I saw that it [lack of awareness] prevented people from being 
concerned at all. I saw that people were not very worried about it because, from 
the beginning, the Mayor's office, the Health Department and the Milwaukee 
Water Works was putting out a lot of misinformation, a lot of misleading 
information, and a lot of assurances that I had to challenge and that I had to 
dismiss and I had to basically show the public it was all a myth. Everything that 
they’re putting out there was a myth, and not only a myth but an attempt to 
misdirect (R. Miranda, phone interview). 
 
FLAC, therefore, set for itself no small feat — to not only educate the public, but also develop 
compelling enough counter narratives to combat the status quo of city with safe water and a 
beneficent local government.  Even those among FLAC’s members who were less convinced by 
a framing of government cover-up readily acknowledged that the lack of information was a 
critical impediment to progress of any kind, and indicative of a different kind of malfeasance: “I 
think the city… it’s not their fault. I don’t think it’s their fault. I think what’s wrong right now 
with the city is that they’re not telling people what they should know.  And that’s just bad 
representation” (Director of FLAC partner organization, phone interview). 
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The depth of public unfamiliarity with the issue, due in no small part to Milwaukee’s 
history of successful lead abatement and water quality control, additionally stemmed from 
general indifference towards the details of municipal functions in general.  Miranda mirthfully 
recounted one such anecdote: 
In 2015, not many people knew we had a Milwaukee Water Works. They thought 
MMSD [Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District] was the one that supplied 
their water. People were confused, a lot of people were confused! I mean, I 
actually had aldermen, I had professionals...I mean, people who are active!  
Everybody thought MMSD was the agency that provided us water, and I said 
‘No! That’s the one who takes the stuff out!’ That’s a prime example of the fact 
that, how the city has failed to really provide the education the public needed to 
protect itself from lead and water. They don’t even have the basic knowledge that 
there is a Milwaukee Water Works (R. Miranda, phone interview). 
 
In this context, FLAC was doing more than simply raising awareness of the existence and 
dangers of lead laterals and the government’s responsibility for remediation, but rather was 
problematizing an action so commonplace — turning on the tap — that many residents had never 
even thought to question the structures and systems responsible for the maintenance of such an 
everyday need.  The status quo of public apathy and disinterest in municipal functionings is 
precisely what FLAC maintains the city used to its advantage, and actively worked to ensure as 
awareness of the dangers of lead laterals began to spread.  As one organizer put it, “people in this 
community do not question what their government does.  It's a lack of awareness and to be very 
honest with you, I don’t believe they [city government] want the community aware” (FLAC 
organizer, personal interview).  In this way, FLAC explicitly tied the lack of information and 
public awareness to their diagnostic framings of government malfeasance. 
 The compounded effect of these obstacles — a city department (MWW) with an 
established record of municipal efficiency, a lack of information, and public unfamiliarity with 
the issue — was to create a crisis that was largely invisible to Milwaukee residents, both in their 
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daily lives and in policy.  This raises a question which has critically guided much of this research 
and FLAC’s early efforts: how do you organize in the absence of a visible, recognized crisis?  
Without a startling government revelation, a noticeable change in water taste or color or any 
visible and motivating public health emergency, FLAC’s motivational and diagnostic framing 
needed to compel Milwaukeeans to act, or demand action of their elected representatives, in the 
absence of definitive proof of the spatial or physical extent of risk posed by the lead laterals.  In 
the absence of the perception that a public health crisis exists, how can a nascent social 
movement persuade victims that they are, in fact, victims?  This quandary underlies much of 
FLAC’s early framing and organizing work, which on the one hand leveraged motivational 
framings whose vocabularies of motive benefited from a lack of public information and 
government acknowledgement, reinforcing a sense of betrayal and neglect.  At the same time, 
the lack of information and government reassurances served to undermine FLAC’s vocabulary of 
urgency, painting the group as radically out of step with the existing state of Milwaukee’s lead 
abatement programs and water quality control.   
One of the main obstacles for FLAC’s organizing was overcoming the highly technical 
language of water science in order to not only reach Milwaukeeans and convince them that the 
LSLs existed, but to further persuade them that the laterals posed a significant and mobilizing 
risk to their safety.  Miranda is pragmatic about the limitations of FLAC’s organizing and 
education efforts, which managed to reach many, but may not have gone far enough: 
My concern is that they're [Milwaukeeans] just aware of it, they really are not 
very versed on the issue. The issue of lead in water is very complicated and can 
be difficult to follow when you’re dealing with experts, or dealing with people 
who are masters at the language, and masters of the issue, and can easily dismiss 
people who are not very well versed on not only the chemistry of what’s going 
with the water treatment, but also the impacts that is made to families. (R. 
Miranda, phone interview).  
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As Miranda notes, the issue of lead in water is complicated; the scientific knowledge 
required to debunk the City’s narrative of safe water and safe water treatment set a very 
high barrier to entry for many Milwaukeeans who were inclined to trust government 
experts.  Unfamiliarity with the complex and inscrutable scientific evidence presented by 
city officials serves as a compelling reason to believe the (often persuasive) narratives 
provided,  
Miranda knew that FLAC would need to fight facts with facts in order to combat official 
narratives of technical knowledge and scientific expertise.  As he’d seen during Alderman Joe 
Davis’ 2016 campaign for mayor, it was impossible to fight back simply by calling attention to 
the issue:  
When Alderman Davis was running for mayor, he was telling people at the time 
that there is contamination and the water was being poisoned by lead, but the 
mayor was refuting him and telling him and telling the public that that's not true, 
and that they have the effective corrosion control treatment measures. And so, you 
know, he was able to defeat Alderman Davis' message because he, Alderman 
Davis, didn’t have the kind of information that he needed in order to counter what 
the message the Mayor was putting out there. And the lesson for me when I saw 
what happened there, and that's why I took more of a time to research and more of 
a time to understand the issue, because I knew what kind of response campaign 
the Mayor was going to come back with. and when I began organizing, and they 
began trying to dismiss what I was saying, I already had the playbook, and I was 
basically responding to them, showing where they're wrong. (R. Miranda, phone 
interview).  
 
As Robert Miranda and FLAC attempted to share information with the public, they relied on lead 
experts, such as Drs. Marc Edwards and Yanna Lambrinidou, to add scientific certainty to 
FLAC’s framings.  Having learned from a campaign that did not manage to contradict the city’s 
official narrative of municipal competence and technical expertise, FLAC fought back by 
attempting to arm themselves and the public with similar expertise, challenging the city’s 
hegemonic use of knowledge. 
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As previously noted, willingness to believe city narratives also stemmed from the simple 
— and, FLAC contends, intentional — misconstruing of the location of the risk, as when Mayor 
Barrett and other city officials would frequently refer to the safety and purity of Milwaukee’s 
water supply and of the city’s water mains.  For FLAC, the ease with which residents were able 
to be misdirected and mollified was directly connected to the lack of publicly available 
information and the specific, proprietary knowledge required to understand the risks posed by 
LSLs.  As an organizer put it, “folks living in those [affected] zip codes don’t know what’s going 
on.  They have no perception” (FLAC organizer, personal interview).  This quote highlights an 
additional nuance, problematizing not only Milwaukeeans’ inclination to trust their government 
when it came to their drinking water, but also the larger systemic forces driving apathy — forces 
which disproportionately affect certain communities that bear the undue burden of many 
political, social and environmental injustices.  
 
5.3 The uneven effects of place 
Although the distribution of Milwaukee’s original LSLs does not correspond to 20th 
century patterns of racial segregation, the spatiality of lead-related health effects does.  City-
developed maps of the laterals paint a picture of a largely uniform spatiality, with laterals 
distributed throughout thirteen of the city’s fifteen aldermanic districts (Figure 2, Table 4).  
However, 2014 city-developed maps of the density and distribution of lead poisoning in 
Milwaukee (Figure 4) reveal that, although lead laterals may have initially been evenly 
distributed across the city, the risk associated with lead has not been similarly equally dispersed.  
In fact, the density map more closely resembles patterns of demographic distribution throughout 
the city because the majority of sources of lead exposure are residential — lead-based paint and 
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Figure 4 — Lead Poisoning Density in the City of Milwaukee, 2014  
Source: City of Milwaukee Health Department 
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dust, soil contamination and LSLs — making any map of lead poisoning density also a map of 
the quality of housing stock in the city.  Given our knowledge of the historic and persistent 
patterns of differential investments into Milwaukee's segregated housing market (see Heynen et 
al 2006), it is unsurprising to see that although the LSLs may be equally dispersed, the risks 
associated with lead exposure are not.  Indeed, the systems which preserve and reproduce the 
social, political and economic unevenness of Milwaukee’s urban spaces ensure that the risks will 
be most acute in those areas most overlooked by investment and policy. 
The age of housing stock is currently the single determinant of whether a residence is at 
risk of having lead laterals.  City estimates for LSL distribution are currently based on which 
houses were built prior to 1962, the year the city stopped using lead in municipal projects, 
meaning older homes are intrinsically ‘riskier.’  However, although the age of structure might be 
the sole determinant for mapping LSLs, it is not the sole determinant for risk.  Older houses in 
more affluent neighborhoods of the city, while technically ‘at-risk’ by virtue of the age of the 
housing stock, are more likely to have benefitted from maintenance incentives and investments 
by higher-income property owners, mitigating the risk of exposure to any of the original lead 
paint or pipes in the home.   On the other hand, the uneven effects of racialized housing practices 
and policies, unscrupulous landlords, and decades of neglect means that older housing stock in 
certain areas of the city will bear a significantly higher chance of containing decades-old lead 
paint, lead plumbing, lead-contaminated soil, and the original lead laterals the home was built 
with — all of the primary methods of lead exposure.  Put another way, the presumed spatiality of 
the LSLs does not make clear the connection between lead and segregation in Milwaukee; only 
when we overlay the spatiality of risk for lead poisoning do we reveal the connections between 
race, poverty, housing and lead.   
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Implications for framing: a city-wide issue 
As these maps show, the presence of lead laterals does not necessarily correspond to risk 
for every neighborhood, posing a unique quandary for FLAC’s organizing.  It is not improbable 
that some might look at the lead poisoning density maps and question FLAC’s foundational 
notion that LSLs pose a risk, given that the risk does not map uniformly to LSL distribution.  In 
spite of this, FLAC vehemently maintains that all lead pipes pose a risk, repeatedly emphasizing 
the geographic extent of the issue and rejecting the notion that the lead laterals are a spatially 
modest and politically manageable issue.  The dramatic number of Milwaukee properties 
potentially affected by lead laterals — 70,000 — is repeatedly employed by activists, organizers 
and community members as part of both diagnostic and motivational frames, a means of 
articulating the scale and gravity of the situation given the overwhelming preponderance of 
Milwaukeeans who were considered to be at-risk.   As to why risk, effect and activism are not 
uniformly distributed throughout the city, organizers argue that certain communities are not only 
under-informed and inclined to trust their government, but are predisposed to mitigate some of 
the risks: 
You look at Zielinski’s district [14], which is number one in pipes, and Murphy’s 
district [10] which is number two. So you look at what is going on there and you 
say okay, you know, what is it that has not galvanized the kind of response you 
would think that those two districts, which have a better standing economically 
and other political issues than, for example, Russell Stamper’s district [15], what 
is causing a delay there? And again, I strongly believe it’s because they [in 
affluent communities] are not informed. They are not informed… they have put 
their trust in government and the Health Department, they believe that their 
water’s safe, they hear all these good things about Milwaukee water, and they 
believe it [...] People say to me, well why aren’t their blood levels higher than 
areas where there are more [LSLs] and you see high blood levels. Well, you 
know, in some cases, probably because they are and have been using filters. It’s 
hard to say what’s going on. But you know, what is certain is that, and I know this 
is something that I’ve asked many over at City Hall, what is certain is that no one 
can guarantee that water flowing through these lead pipes is safe. And I always 
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ask that, can you guarantee it? Nobody can (R. Miranda, phone interview).  
 
Because they maintain that every lead pipe is a danger to Milwaukee citizens, here, then is part 
of FLAC’s most difficult challenge; before the group can make LSL remediation a politically 
viable mission, they must first make visible to a large number of Milwaukeeans the latent, 
invisible risk lying beneath their homes, which on one city map places them ‘at-risk’ yet on 
another finds them to be risk-free.  While this particular hurdle for organizers is dealt with in 
greater detail in a subsequent section (see Section 5.5), it is helpful here to demonstrate that 
FLAC maintains this is an issue which affects almost every Milwaukee neighborhood and 
resident, in spite of lead poisoning data, in spite of residents’ unwillingness to believe, and in 
spite of lifestyle choices — such as filters — which may have inadvertently mitigated its most 
dangerous effects.  Or, as one FLAC organizer succinctly put it: “we all gotta drink the water” 
(FLAC organizer, personal interview). 
Indeed, this universal framing seems to have purchase, as one of the neighborhoods most 
affected by LSLs but least afflicted by lead poisoning has taken the political lead in the fight for 
government remediation.  Alderman Tony Zielinski represents the disproportionately White 14th 
District, which covers the Bay View neighborhood.  Although Zielinski's constituents are 
predominantly White, highly-educated and employed, their district also has the highest number 
of lead laterals in the city: 9,452, or 13.8% of all of the city’s LSLs (see Table 3, 4).  Since news 
of the laterals — and their distribution — became public, Zielinski has worked with community 
organizers and lobbyists to present legislation to the Common Council.  For FLAC, this means 
that a city-wide framing has political viability and a potentially widespread constituency. As 
NAACP president Fred Royal noted, “not all of the City’s problems occur in the 53206,” and this 
is therefore not an issue which only affected communities of color, but rather “a citywide issue 
  
63 
 
Table 3 — Residential Lead Service Lines by Aldermanic District  
Ald. District Number of Properties 
with LSLs 
Percent of Residential District 
Properties with LSLs 
Percent of Citywide LSL 
Residential Properties 
1 4,747 49.2% 7.0% 
2 7 0.1% 0.01% 
3 5,104 94.3% 7.5% 
4 1,315 82.0% 1.9% 
5 1,036 9.7% 1.5% 
6 7,243 90.4% 10.6% 
7 8,139 74.9% 11.9% 
8 6,361 96.9% 9.3% 
9 0 0.0% 0.0% 
10 9,166 83.0% 13.4% 
11 1,627 13.8% 2.4% 
12 5,585 93.1% 8.2% 
13 2,413 23.8% 3.5% 
14 9,452 85.7% 13.8% 
15 6,089 78.5% 8.9% 
 68,284 54.2% 100.0% 
Source: Milwaukee Department of Administration Budget and Management Division, 2016 
 
that needs to be addressed” (qtd. in Deprey 2017).  If neighborhoods who bear the burden of 
LSLs without the equivalent risks of lead poisoning are willing to join with organizers and 
demand government action, there is a possibility that every one of the 70,000 affected residences 
is a potential site of mobilization for FLAC’s LSM. 
 
Implications for framing: a localized issue 
A side-by-side comparison of LSL distribution versus lead poisoning in three of 
Milwaukee’s aldermanic districts (Figure 5) makes clear that for LSLs to cause lead poisoning,  
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Figure 5 — Lead Poisoning Density vs. Lateral Distribution in Ald. Districts 10, 12 & 14 
Source: City of Milwaukee Health Department, Milwaukee Water Works 
 
 
the risks of the laterals must be compounded by other effects.  The density of lead poisoning is 
unmistakably more critical in district 12, which, in spite of having the lowest number of LSLs of 
all three districts (5,585 laterals, as compared to 9,166 in district 10 and 9,452 in district 14) has 
the highest proportion of LSLs: those 5,585 laterals represent 93.1% of all residential properties 
in district 12.  The demographics of the districts are also significant here (Table 4); not only is 
district 12 the only majority non-White of the three districts represented above, it has a 
significantly lower average residential value and more than double the number of vacant  
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Table 4 — Demographic Information and LSL share by Aldermanic District  
 District 10 
Ald. Michael Murphy 
District 12 
Ald. José Pérez 
District 14 
Ald. Tony Zielinski 
Total Population 
% Non-Hispanic White 
% Black 
% Asian 
% Hispanic 
39,980 
54.07% 
32.25% 
2.54% 
7.35% 
39,808 
14.56% 
9.29% 
1.74% 
71.87% 
38,512 
63.49% 
3.1% 
1.18% 
29.0% 
Total Households 
Total Properties 
Avg. Residential Value 
% Vacant 
17,148 
12,590 
$129,139 
1.61% 
11,860 
8,319 
$83,516 
4.09% 
16,310 
12,636 
$156,167 
2.07% 
No.of Lead Laterals 
% of District Properties 
% of Citywide LSLs 
9,166 
83.0% 
13.4% 
5,585 
93.1% 
8.2% 
9,452 
85.7% 
13.8% 
Source: City of Milwaukee.  Data Source: Online Aldermanic District Statistics 
 
 
properties.  Therefore, alongside an expansive ‘city-wide’ framing, organizers simultaneously 
sought to emphasize the locally specific patterns of lateral distribution, highlighting the 
disproportionate effects (physical, financial, political) of the laterals upon certain of Milwaukee’s 
lower-income, predominantly-minority neighborhoods.  
Especially in the poorer communities [...] people just don’t have insurance.  
People see that [remediation measures] as a cost that they just can’t afford. And 
so for them it’s like, you know, I could spend money to deal with this matter or I 
won’t have any money to buy groceries or I won’t have any money to pay for the 
light bill. And so you know, it’s a matter of choices here. And you know, so this 
is where the government’s gotta come in and say we’re gonna pay for these pipes, 
we’re gonna remove all this stuff (R. Miranda, phone interview).  
 
As a result of these realities, FLAC efforts have been focused predominantly on organizing in 
low-income neighborhoods on the North side of Milwaukee, “focusing on really trying to 
provide information to those communities and our focus is make sure that the government does 
what it can to remove the pipes in those areas without any cost to them” (R. Miranda, phone 
interview). 
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If we accept that the uneven nature of the segregated city will be reproduced in the 
density of lead poisoning, there are necessary implications for how the issue of lead laterals will 
be framed: who among the most affected are the potential constituents of any nascent social 
movement?  There is a range of possible framings that we might expect to encounter, including 
environmental justice issue that disproportionately affects poor neighborhoods of color, whose 
residents are already burdened with other sources of lead exposure.  If this an issue that ‘belongs’ 
to certain areas of the city, remediation would be contingent upon certain elected officials acting 
on behalf of their affected constituents, thereby providing political cover to other elected officials 
whose constituents have LSLs but have not felt the risks of LSLs.   
 
Political implications of place- and scale-frames 
Early diagnostic framing by FLAC and other community members reveal this tension of 
scale in their articulations of grievances, between the locally specific effects of the laterals and 
their spatially diverse distribution.  These inherent tensions are reproduced in the diagnostic and 
prognostic framing — who, then, is responsible, and what should the solutions look like?  Is this 
an issue that requires coalition-building across all neighborhoods and their representatives? Is it 
therefore one that holds all elected officials equally responsible for remediation? Or it is a locally 
specific issue, for which certain amongst the City’s representatives should be held primarily 
accountable, and others might be able to escape notice? Further, what are the political realities of 
compelling municipal action — as many local organizers bitterly acknowledge, this is not an 
issue that elected officials seem eager to sign on to: 
I wouldn’t expect much out of local government. It took a disaster declaration in 
Flint, and like a whole bunch of resources from the state and the feds, then. We 
don’t have any resources, and we don’t have a disaster.  I just don’t see anyone 
from the Health Department or the Mayor’s office, or for that matter the Common 
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Council wanting to like, do something to change the situation (Director of FLAC 
partner organization, phone interview). 
 
The political unattractiveness of this ostensibly city-wide issue coupled with its uneven effects 
present a major obstacle for FLAC’s efforts.  On the one hand, the group could endeavor to 
persuade all Milwaukeeans to call on their elected officials and rely on political coalition-
building to develop a comprehensive solution, an unlikely outcome given the demonstrated 
unwillingness of politicians to act in absence of a crisis.  Alternatively, FLAC could continue its 
focused organizing efforts, so as to rally the elected officials responsible for the areas most 
disproportionately affected by lead poisoning.  By speaking to (and for) different constituencies, 
these widely disparate strategies would rely on fundamentally different political opportunity 
structures and would each pose a set of distinct challenges and advantages for the group. 
Paradoxically, the most vocal elected official, Alderman Zielinski, has been one whose 
constituents have the most LSLs but among the lowest cases of lead poisoning; political cover, in 
this case, is afforded to those aldermen whose constituents are too disenfranchised to compel 
their representatives to action.  LSM activists are vociferous in assigning this discrepancy in 
action as representative of an unwillingness to take on unpopular issues. This unwillingness, in 
turn, originates from the political opportunity structures of Milwaukee, with a political and 
demographic context that does not impel leaders to action: 
The likelihood of these people [elected officials] doing just about anything on 
anything progressive is very small to me. [...] If we want to fix all these things, 
they have to go, and people have to stop looking at them as like, installations in 
our City Hall. They're just people that can go. Like I said, people in Milwaukee 
get used to how it is, they also get used to their poor leaders and don't envision 
that there could be another options out there. (FLAC organizer, personal 
interview) 
 
The pugnacious efforts of Alderman Zielinski as contrasted with the efforts of some of his fellow 
aldermen has come to be seen as demonstrative of the effects of the presumed political cover the 
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uneven risk of LSLs can provide elected officials.  Zielinski's efforts (District 14) stand in stark 
contrast to those of Aldermen Murphy (District 10) and Pérez (District 12), who represent 
districts with the second highest number of laterals and the highest number of cases of lead 
poisoning, respectively.  And yet, these aldermen have been remarkably tight-lipped on the issue, 
and have expressed an unwillingness to partner or meet with FLAC and other activists in support 
of remediation efforts or publicly acknowledge the gravity of the problem.   
In a sense, FLAC is trying to leverage the city-wide scale of the issue to remedy 
concentrated effects.  The group’s multi-scalar framing relies on the political opportunity posed 
by the dramatically widespread dispersal of the LSLs as a motivational framing to ensure 
government resources are brought to the areas that are disproportionately affected by lead 
exposure and routinely underserved by their elected officials.  What, then, are the implications of 
multiple iterations of diagnostic and prognostic framings — either city-wide or localized?  How 
might these multiscalar frames alter the group’s potential activism, resource mobilization, and 
remediation?  As the last few years have shown, municipal responses to these two framings have 
the effect of working against one another; responses have either catered weakly to FLAC’s city-
wide framing but proved insufficient to the address magnitude of the issue, or have attempted to 
address the unevenness of lead risk by making residents more responsible for personally 
mitigating those risks.  This runs directly contrary to FLAC’s framings: not only do these 
municipal responses fail to adequately address the spatial comprehensiveness of LSLs, but they 
re-burden those residents who are most affected by lead exposure with the added responsibility 
of employing mitigation strategies.  A closer examination of these municipal responses will help 
to illuminate these tensions in action.   
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5.4 Insufficient municipal responses and the individuation of risk 
Although the City has responded to some of FLAC’s prognostic framings with interim 
solutions, they have been insufficient to address the issue and have effectively shifted 
responsibility for mitigating LSL-related risks upon Milwaukee residents, an individuation of 
risk for which FLAC’s framing has had to adapt.  In lieu of legislative solutions for government 
action, the city has instead proposed solutions which are stop-gap measures that place an 
additional financial, emotional and physical burden upon residents.  These solutions suggest that 
residents must assume responsibility for their own health outcomes by taking the following 
measures: purchasing and maintaining lead-certified water filters; seeking additional lead testing 
for children under the age of three; and flushing the water in their taps for three minutes every 
morning, to remove any stagnant water and potential lead particles.  Not only do these solutions 
place responsibility on residents instead of government, where FLAC contends it ultimately 
rests, but they also pose a problem for FLAC’s mission of full removal of the lead laterals 
because they are interim measures rather than comprehensive solutions, effectively shifting the 
political opportunity structure for organizers.  If, in fact, interim measures are able to effectively 
manage the crisis by mitigating immediate risks for Milwaukee residents, they may have the 
perverse effect of undermining FLAC’s political opportunity by relieving the pressure on 
government to pursue comprehensive, long-term solutions. 
 
Water Filters 
One of the City’s most significant responses to date — a free filter distribution program 
— has still been underfunded and insufficient to address the magnitude of the problem.  This 
municipal failing has added fuel to FLAC’s framing of an intentionally unresponsive City 
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government.  The November 2016 filter distribution program was managed in partnership with 
Sixteenth Street Community Health Centers (SSCHC).  However, the demand far outstripped the 
City’s resources; in spite of having initially alerted more than 70,000 homeowners that their 
property was at risk as a result of lead laterals, the City only procured 2,000 filters for 
distribution, or enough for less than three percent of affected residences (Bence 2016).  In fact, 
even the Mayor’s promise of 2,000 filters  — already a quantity insufficient for the needs of 
residents — was an overestimation of what the city could procure; the filters were not purchased 
with municipal funds, but with $90,000 raised by The United Way of Greater Milwaukee & 
Waukesha County, which was only sufficient to acquire 1,725 filters.  From the outset, critics 
were vocal about the inadequacy of the filter program, and the City’s inability to fully fund filter 
distribution without seeking outside financing, contrasting it with other big-budget projects the 
City had successfully undertaken: 
Government needs to move on this like they move on stadiums. Like, if they want 
to build Miller Park, if they want to build the Bucks stadium, these guys move 
fast. You know, they have no problem finding hundreds and hundreds of millions 
of dollars to do those kind of things, but when it comes to doing something that is 
more of a related to the needs of people, it just seems like they want to drag their 
feet. (R. Miranda, phone interview) 
 
Criticisms such as these are premised upon a public perception of the City of Milwaukee as 
continuously and intentionally misplacing its priorities, more interested in funding flashy 
downtown projects than a meagre filter distribution program, a perception upon which much of 
FLAC’s diagnostic and motivational framing rests.  For Milwaukee residents, expensive public 
projects like the Bucks Stadium, Miller Park and the streetcar (“The Hop”) serve as visible 
reminders of the City’s ability to “move fast,” as Robert Miranda puts it, for certain projects.  A 
stark contrast to the pace at which the City has responded to FLAC’s organizing, these projects 
serve to highlight the inadequacy of the City’s response to LSL remediation.  This sentiment is 
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not restricted to activists and organizers; at a City Council meeting, Alderman Borkowski noted 
that “if you can find money for a streetcar, if you can find money for a Bucks Arena” then there 
was reason to believe “where there's a will there's a way” to find money for a more 
comprehensive municipal response to LSLs (Milwaukee City Council, December 13, 2015). 
Anger over the City’s funding priorities was compounded by the inadequacy of the filter 
distribution program.  Although SSCHC, the City’s non-profit partner organization for the 
program, organized two weekday evening events on the South Side of Milwaukee in November 
of 2016 and distributed 800 filters, the events were ‘first come first serve,’ and supplies at one 
event ran out in less than an hour.  Over one hundred residents optimistically left their phone 
numbers to be alerted in case more filters became available in the following calendar year, 2017 
(WUWM, September 12, 2017).  For North Side residents, distribution was only available 
through the office of the Social Development Commission, which operates during regular 
business hours from 8 a.m. - 5 p.m. on weekdays, a considerable inconvenience for those 
Milwaukeeans who are required to be at their own place of work during those hours.  A further 
limitation for residents are the stipulations for filter eligibility: only households with children 
under 6 or with pregnant or breastfeeding women may receive a free water filter, and all 
subsequent replacement filtration cartridges (which must be replaced every three months in order 
to be maximally effective) are to be purchased at residents’ own expense.  Although FLAC 
agrees that filters provide the best immediate protection for residents with LSLs, the group has 
largely dismissed the utility of the filter distribution program, instead seeing it as evidence of the 
magnitude of the issue and the City’s inability — or unwillingness — to sufficiently respond.  As 
one FLAC organizer put it, “the way that Milwaukee is looking at this issue, [it’s] like you're 
putting a band aid on a bullet to the heart” (FLAC organizer, personal interview).  
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The limitations and inconsistencies of the filter program have fundamentally shifted the 
political opportunity structure by making residents responsible for ensuring their own health 
outcomes, effectively relieving government of its obligation to protect residents’ health.   For 
FLAC, this means that not only has the calculus for potential solutions shifted, but emphasis has 
been refocused on a solution that is not financially realistic for all Milwaukeeans.  In this altered 
political opportunity structure, where filters are the best solution currently available, some now 
maintain that it is residents’ responsibility to ‘make good decisions’ and get one, in spite of how 
the financial burden might differentially affect residents:  
When it comes to like, you know, the filtering issue and how much a filter 
product costs, and you know you say, well, I know piles of poor people who can’t 
afford a filter….I would argue that if they knew the risk they would make good 
decisions, and lots of people would buy their own filters. (Director of FLAC 
partner organization, phone interview) 
 
The idea that residents who ‘know best’ will assume responsibility for their health and purchase 
a filter mistakenly presumes that all Milwaukee residents are uniformly able to afford and 
maintain a water filter.  Not only that, it suggests that residents who do not buy a filter are doing 
so because they are either ignorant of the risk or indifferent to the outcome — a sweeping 
generalization which disregards the real, everyday choices faced by those living at or below the 
poverty line.  As Robert Miranda put it, “a lot more people are apt to sacrifice their health to 
have heat in the home” (R. Miranda, personal interview), a grim reality that underscores FLAC’s 
emphatic prognostic framing: government must be held solely responsible for uniformly 
removing the sources of lead exposure, because choosing health is not a luxury every Milwaukee 
resident enjoys.  
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Ordinance 160742 
The most ambitious legislative proposal for remediation, Ordinance 160742, is similarly 
viewed by activists as a meagre measure with too long a timeframe, leaving Milwaukeeans 
vulnerable in the intervening years.  The ordinance, passed in December 2016, is a purported 
solution to begin addressing the LSLs.  It ensures that if an LSL is discovered in the course of 
Milwaukee Water Works’ regular main replacement work, the City will replace its portion of the 
lateral — and mandates that the homeowner do the same, within 10 days.  Because many 
homeowners might be unable to pay for a costly emergency project on such short notice, the 
ordinance proposed a cost-share plan, whereby the city would assume two-thirds of the 
homeowner’s cost, with a maximum cost to the homeowner of $1,600 (which can be paid off 
over the course of ten years).  Although activists celebrated the passage of legislation, FLAC 
took grave issue with the precedent the ordinance established: that residents are responsible for 
their LSLs, and for any associated risks or costs.   
I am pleased that the Common Council and the bureaucrats at the City are moving 
on this. I am disappointed that the legislation did pass because, again, I just 
believe wholeheartedly that the taxpayer, the property owner, the homeowner 
should not be paying one penny of any shared cost, I don’t care if it’s $1,600, 
$800, they shouldn’t be paying one penny (R. Miranda, phone interview). 
 
The ordinance was received with horror by FLAC and other community advocates, who recall 
being “stunned” that low-income residents’ inability to pay for this construction would have 
draconian consequences — in order to ensure that residents cooperate with these replacements in 
a timely way, the ordinance included provisions by which the city could compel homeowners to 
cooperate, from issuing fines to shutting off the water supply of non-compliant homeowners.  
Additionally, the ordinance did not necessarily signal a departure from MWW’s business 
as usual, as replacements would only happen as they coincide with existing, scheduled work and 
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infrastructure projects.  At best, the ordinance relies upon luck, building efficiencies into 
MWW’s existing main replacement program and addressing lead service lines only as they are 
discovered in the course of routine work.  A former budget specialist for the city explained:  
We’ll still be doing [water main] replacements all this time. You know, 
presumably. So you know, it may be that we’ll get lucky, and some of the water 
mains we replace are ones that otherwise are busted, you know...but you know, 
when you’re talking about 60,000 [sic] lead service lines, they could be scattered 
all over. (Milwaukee Budget & Management specialist, phone interview) 
 
Any plans to accelerate main replacement (and, by extension, LSLs) were speculative, and even 
a best-case scenario would only include and additional 300-500 planned replacements, according 
to city budgeting specialists.  Therefore, even an ‘aggressively’ scaled-up version of the 
ordinance would not present a full solution for nearly 150 years, the length of time required to 
replace all 70,000 LSLs at the city’s proposed pace of work, an untenable solution for organizers 
and residents.  Although FLAC has consistently held government solely responsible for a 
comprehensive municipal solution for remediation, due to the limitations of both City resources 
and political will organizers have had to balance this with a pragmatism about the need for 
immediate, interim solutions, a further individuation of risk that focuses on how residents can 
protect themselves until a more comprehensive solution can be achieved. 
 
“Lead-Safe Milwaukee” 
Another municipal measure which shifted focus from the lead laterals to individual 
behavior was the City’s lead awareness campaign, which debuted in early 2017.  The media 
campaign, “Lead-Safe Milwaukee” (Figure 6) was comprised of bus ads, a website and 
brochures distributed with water bills.  The cartoon campaign was in Mayor Barrett’s words, “a 
very friendly reminder to parents to do what they can to make sure their kids are safe” (WUWM,  
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Figure 6 — 2016 Lead-Safe Milwaukee Campaign, Bus Shelter Ad 
Source: LeadSafeMKE.org 
 
September 12, 2017).  Many activists dismissed this “friendly reminder” as too mollifying, 
placing “safe water” in the context of “safe paint,” “safe kids,” instead of drawing attention to 
the dangers posed by LSLs, which organizers deemed to be the public health crisis at hand.  
Additionally, activists argued that the campaign placed the burden of responsibility upon 
residents and parents for the health of their homes and their children, informing residents of the 
steps they should already be taking to keep their families safe and reinforcing the idea of 
Milwaukee as a “Lead-Safe” city, per the campaign’s own title.  Brenda Coley, FLAC member 
and the co-executive director of Milwaukee Water Commons, saw the campaign as evidence of 
the city’s priorities, noting “I don’t think they’ve [the City] been much interested in letting the 
public know in a concise clear way, what the issue is” (WUWM, September 12, 2017).  This 
criticism seems to echo FLAC’s contention that the city’s response is not incidentally 
insufficient, but rather is rooted — for a host of pernicious reasons — in an unwillingness to 
respond sufficiently. 
Taken together, these municipal efforts have either directed Milwaukee residents to 
assume more personal responsibility for mitigating the risks posed by the LSLs, or (as was the 
case with the limited supply of filters) left them with little choice but to find an alternate 
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solution.  At a North Side community event organized by FLAC in November 2016, residents 
repeatedly asked panelists what measures they could take to protect themselves and their families 
in the absence of government action.  FLAC’s prognostic and motivational framings have had to 
account for this delegation of responsibility, placing emphasis on ways residents can help 
themselves in addition to lobbying for government-funded solutions.  This poses a predicament 
for FLAC’s framing and its efforts to organize residents, essentially dividing the issue of the 
LSLs into two separate crises: on the one hand, an immediate danger posed to the public, to be 
managed in the short term; on the other hand a larger, more complex crisis, for which 
comprehensive solutions must be sought. If interim solutions are successful in managing the 
short-term crisis, any immediate risk posed to residents will be minimized or eliminated.   
Paradoxically, a successfully-managed crisis — for as long as residents are willing to partake in 
short-term measures — alleviates some of the urgency for politicians to devise longer-term, more 
expensive and politically arduous solutions.  Miranda maintains that FLAC’s mission has been 
clear from the outset: “Remove the lead pipes, there is no other alternative to eradicating lead in 
water, it’s just to remove the lead pipes. And that’s our purpose, is to push the government to 
prioritize, to send resources towards removing lead pipes” (R. Miranda, phone interview).  If the 
crisis is being effectively managed in the short term, mitigating — for those residents who can 
afford these measures — any risk of lead poisoning, what impetus remains to compel 
government to search for a long-term fix to remove any potential source of lead exposure?  
Even some of FLAC’s organizers seem to recognize these as two separate crises: one to 
be managed in the short-term, and one that demands comprehensive government action.  In an 
interview, one FLAC organizer mentioned that being able to afford a filter relieved him of any 
immediate fears about the public health crisis: “for some people like me, I don't have kids, I can 
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afford a filter, I can handle all that...as far as like, a personal risk to my health, right now I don't 
feel it is. [...] Like I already said, I can take care of the health risk on my own” (FLAC organizer, 
personal interview).  In this calculus, providing residents with interim solutions effectively 
bisects their prognostic frames into one set of immediate actions for residents’ protections, and a 
separate set of long-term actions for government.  This duality further undermines a framing 
which holds government solely responsible, given that the majority of interim solutions — 
flushing, childhood testing, filtering (both the distribution and purchasing subsequent cartridge 
replacements) — will be undertaken by residents, health care providers and local organizations. 
Further, these ‘interim solutions’ may turn out to be anything but interim, if — as Ordinance 
160742 suggests — full remediation may take upwards of 30 years.  If interim solutions prove 
capable of reducing the health risks to acceptable levels for another three decades, FLAC may 
find itself demanding that the government respond to a public health crisis which no longer 
exists.  
 
Reading Survey Data: Perceptions of Responsibility and Stop-gap Strategies 
This tension between short-term and long-term solutions is already evident in the way 
many residents understand the issue of LSLs, as can be seen in analysis of a survey conducted by 
16th Street Community Health Centers (SSCHC) at two 2018 lead education events.  The data 
from these surveys reveals that while residents hold government primarily responsible, aligning 
with FLAC’s demands for full remediation, residents are more likely to emphasize the 
importance of short-term strategies to mitigate the effects of lead, rather than remove the risk 
entirely.  The rank ordered survey was distributed as residents arrived at each event, and asked 
respondents to rank a list of possible remediation strategies (Figure 8), and the groups who had  
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Question: In your opinion, which of these groups have the most responsibility in addressing lead poisoning? 
Please rank (1 to 5) in order of importance, with 1 being the most important, and 5 the least important. Results 
below reflect pre- and post-event survey responses. 
 
Property Owners Government Organizations Parents Health Providers 
 
 
PRE (n=34) 
 
POST (n=34) 
Figure 7 — 16th Street Survey Responses (Responsibility) 
Data Source: 16th Street Community Health Center 
 
 
the most responsibility in addressing lead poisoning (Figure 7).  The survey was re-administered 
at the conclusion of the session, after residents had heard from a number of health professionals, 
city representatives and lead abatement specialists, to see if the information provided had 
changed residents’ perceptions.  Although the sessions did not reveal a notable shift in 
respondents rankings (n=34), it did demonstrate that residents overwhelmingly held government 
responsible for addressing lead poisoning: 56.8% of respondents ranked government number 1 in 
pre-surveys, and 52.9% ranked government number 1 in post-surveys (Figure 7). 
Respondents did not demonstrate a similar uniformity in their rankings for strategies, 
which showed residents to be far more divided — no single strategy garnered more than 39% of 
first place rankings (Figure 8).  Further, the rankings for strategies were incongruous with 
FLAC’s prognostic framing of full removal of the lead laterals, in that the strategies which 
received the most votes were mitigation strategies, designed to deal with mediating existing lead  
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Question: In your opinion, which of the following strategies is the most important to focus on to address lead 
poisoning? Please rank (1 to 7) in order of importance, with 1 being the most important, and 7 the least 
important. Results below reflect pre- and post-event survey responses. 
 
 
Lead lateral 
replacement 
Education 
opportunities 
Childhood lead 
testing 
Water filter 
distribution 
Lead paint  
abatement 
Soil & landscape 
improvements 
Soil lead 
testing 
 
PRE (n=24) 
 
POST (n=24) 
Figure 8 — 16th Street Survey Responses (Strategies) 
Data Source: 16th Street Community Health Center 
 
 
exposure, rather than strategies to remove the source of exposure.  Lead education opportunities 
was the highest ranked strategy (27.8% ranked first pre-survey, 38.7% in post), with the 
remaining responses split amongst water filter distribution (25% pre, 26.7% post), lead paint 
abatement (8.3% pre, 6.5% post) and childhood lead testing, which saw the largest jump (8.3% 
pre, 19.4% post).  Together, filter distribution, education opportunities and childhood lead 
testing garnered more than 70% of first place ranking in post- surveys.  All of these can be 
considered to represent pragmatic mitigation strategies — a recognition that lead exposure is 
unavoidable, but that its most hazardous effects can be contained through a variety of measures.  
The only two strategies listed which would wholly eliminate the possibility of lead exposure, 
lead lateral replacement and lead paint abatement, received a total of 35.8% of first place 
rankings in the pre- surveys, but fell to 26.7% in post-surveys.  Lead lateral replacement alone 
failed to garner more than 25% of first place rankings pre-survey, and fell to only 19.4% in post-
  
80 
 
survey responses.  While it is not surprising that residents might prioritize strategies which give 
them an immediate measure of control over their lead exposure, this carries serious implications 
for FLAC’s organizing efforts and their ability to leverage community activism to pressure 
government into pursuing full removal of Milwaukee’s LSLs. 
If these survey responses suggest that Milwaukeeans are willing to accept interim 
solutions or personally undertake the necessary steps to mitigate the risks of lead poisoning, 
there is similarly pressure for organizers to pursue a strategy focused on interim measures rather 
than full remediation.  These divergent strategies are already underway, as a leader of one of 
FLAC’s partner organizations explained: 
I have tremendous respect for Robert [Miranda] and all the work that they’ve 
[FLAC] been doing on this issue, because without ‘em people wouldn’t be 
thinking about doing anything about it. He and I may disagree whether first 
priority is removing the lead pipes or just filtering and getting a public campaign 
out there so that people understand the risks, make the decisions, start filtering. 
(Director of FLAC partner organization, phone interview) 
 
As emphasized in the quote above, alternative strategies to FLAC’s campaign of full remediation 
are contingent upon residents actively assuming greater responsibility, acting in their own best 
interests and making decisions to pursue interim solutions.  In spite of how this devolved 
responsibility runs contrary to FLAC’s framings, organizers recognize that “getting filters on 
people's faucets is important….it's not a casual stopgap measure, it's an important stopgap 
measure” (Local organizer, personal interview).  These interim measures provide residents a 
critical measure of autonomy over their own well-being, and a recourse to solutions in the 
deafening absence of comprehensive government action.  The same organizer quoted above 
pragmatically noted “I mean logistically, can we just tear up every street and rip all the pipes out 
in two years? No. So that means that we better have a pretty good long-term plan for water 
filtration until then” (Local organizer, personal interview).  Both residents and organizers 
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understand that, as things currently stand, even the most aggressive municipal response would 
place full remediation an unacceptable number of years in the distance, perhaps necessitating that 
these “stopgap” measures serve as long-term — possibly lifetime — solutions. 
If a comprehensive solution is indeed decades away, interim solutions are critical 
measures by which residents may protect themselves from risk, a reality for which FLAC’s 
framing must adapt. Pragmatism therefore necessitates that FLAC pursue a prognostic framing 
that bifurcates solutions and responsibility, demanding both full removal of the laterals and an 
increased emphasis on interim measures. However, a bifurcated notion of responsibility — 
divided between ultimate responsibility for a long-term solution and interim responsibility for 
necessary, stop-gap measures — has important implications for FLAC’s organizing strategy and 
demands.  The group has adjusted their demands to account for these interim measures, but is 
loath to budge on their diagnostic framings of ultimate responsibility: 
Demand: for the City to develop a comprehensive plan for lead removal and 
mitigation (pipes and paint). This plan must not burden home owners [sic] and 
renters with implementation costs, it must continually provide water filters to 
affected residences, and must include the complete removal of all lead laterals in 
the City within a generation (FLAC Community Assembly Agenda, April 2018).  
 
Although FLAC may have amended their official demands, an uneasy relationship exists 
between these two prognostic framings, in that interim measures such as filtering and education 
programs may lessen the political pressure on city government by dint of their very 
effectiveness.   
Although organizers may agree that interim measures are necessary for public health, 
demands for short term solutions may allow Milwaukee's elected officials latitude in continuing 
to evade the question of complicated, expensive long-term solutions.  While short-term measures 
may reduce the likelihood of lead poisoning for some residents, it can never fully remove the 
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risk.  As one organizer put it, “you drag out the water filter and say a water filter is going to take 
100% of the lead out of the water— there’s not a water filter manufactured by man! They’re 
[government] using that as a band aid but they're not continuing to talk about removing these 
pipes” (FLAC organizer, personal interview).  Not only do these solutions place responsibility on 
residents instead of government, where FLAC contends it ultimately rests, they pose a problem 
for FLAC’s mission of full removal of the lead laterals because they are interim measures 
focused on minimizing risk, rather than removing it.  If interim measures are able to effectively 
manage the crisis by mitigating immediate risks for Milwaukee residents for decades to come, 
they may have the perverse effect of undermining FLAC’s political opportunity by removing any 
immediate public health crisis, relieving the pressure on government to pursue comprehensive, 
long-term solutions.   
In spite of the neoliberal context within which residents are willing to assume greater 
responsibility, this study does not contend that the individuated risk and increased emphasis on 
short-term solutions is solely the result of government neglect or a neoliberal governmentality; 
rather, I argue that we must take seriously the role of lead itself in frustrating FLAC’s ultimate 
prognostic framings, and in facilitating the ease with which residents will either accept 
responsibility for interim measure or do without any sort of comprehensive solution.  Therefore, 
the next section explores more fully the unique properties of Milwaukee’s lead laterals. 
 
5.5 The invisibility of lead 
As this research has attempted to demonstrate, much of FLAC’s work has been devoted 
to persuading Milwaukeeans and their elected officials that LSLs pose a compelling and 
galvanizing public health risk.  This begs the question, is there something about lead which 
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makes it uniquely difficult to organize around?  Or, more specifically, is there something about 
Milwaukee’s urban lead — positioned within networks of space, race, politics and non-humans 
— which makes it uniquely difficult to organize around, and irreconcilably different from other 
urban lead environmental justice movements?  Although the recent horrors of Flint’s urban lead 
crisis have at times served as part of FLAC’s motivational framing, colloquially invoked by 
activists as a similar and galvanizing example of lead poisoning and racialized, political 
callousness, this chapter argues that Milwaukee’s case of urban lead is distinct from Flint.  When 
we expand our analysis, in the vein of Actor Network Theory (ANT) to consider the relational 
networks of power and agency, we can consider not only the uniqueness of lead and the 
challenges it poses for organizers, but the unique ways in which the networks of which 
Milwaukee’s urban lead are a part have conditioned and hampered the efforts of FLAC and other 
activists.  The “actor network” at issue in Milwaukee includes the spatiality of the pipes, the 
history of their development, the racialized and segregated landscape of the city, and numerous 
other ‘actants’ that together distinguish the lead in Milwaukee’s pipes, making its visibility more 
contested, more challenging and more complex.   
The crisis to which FLAC has devoted itself is, for a variety of reasons, ‘invisible’; it is 
largely unseen not only in public discourse or media coverage but in the sense that the lead 
laterals and the risks associated with them are difficult — geographically, temporally, materially 
and physically — to locate.  In spite of this ‘invisible’ crisis, FLAC has successfully agitated for 
overt government acknowledgement of the issue, greater distribution of information to the 
public, and tangible (if meagre) municipal responses to FLAC’s prognostic framing.  However, 
the group has still struggled to garner a sufficient collective response from residents with their 
motivational framing.  If the purpose of diagnostic and motivational framing in social 
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movements is to generate collective action and mobilize those affected, we might see this modest 
public response as one example of how an ‘invisible’ crisis might affect public perception of 
these framings, making the issue easy for residents to ignore and for elected officials to deny.  
Therefore, I suggest that the uneven public response to FLAC’s organizing efforts cannot be 
sufficiently explained solely through frame analysis; rather, I contend that we must take seriously 
the role of non-humans in shaping perceptions of the embodied risks attached to the LSLs, and 
who then ultimately bears responsibility for their remediation.  Lead is more than simply the 
subject at hand; it plays an agential and significant role in shaping (and inhibiting) framings, 
perceptions, and actions, often because its presence —  in the ground, the water, and the body — 
is so difficult to prove. 
The most unambiguous way in which Milwaukee’s lead crisis is invisible is that the water 
is objectively inconspicuous.  Unlike the lead crisis in Flint, MI, Milwaukee’s water does not 
appear perceptibly dangerous; it neither tastes, smells nor looks ‘dangerous,’ and because there is 
no instigating public health event for current crisis, Milwaukee residents have not seen their 
water quality change. In Robert Miranda’s eyes, this is what makes Milwaukee water “more 
insidious” than Flint, a threat that communicates, by dint of its invisibility, a false sense of 
security to residents (R. Miranda, phone interview).  This hurdle of perception is a high bar for 
FLAC and other organizers, who must provide a diagnostic and motivational framing compelling 
enough to cause residents to examine an habitual action — turning on their tap — as dangerous, 
in spite of a lack of discernable evidence that doing so poses an imminent risk.  A FLAC 
member who runs a local non-profit health organization likened this to the education efforts 
around the AIDS crisis in the 1980s, where risk was ambiguous and the solutions required a 
fundamental change in everyone’s personal, sexual behaviors: 
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People had to change, completely change their behaviors around sex in order to 
stay safe, and you didn’t even want to get the test because you were afraid to find 
out, because you knew you had done things that were risky. So I think it’s a lot 
like that, because I can say to people ‘go get tested’ but I would be willing to bet 
that I have not have not been able to convince one fucking person to get tested 
(Director of FLAC partner organization, phone interview). 
 
While it the inconspicuous nature of Milwaukee’s water may be a significant obstacle for 
organizers to overcome in persuading residents to change their everyday behaviors, it is also 
important to note that due to the differentiation housing stock in the city, not all Milwaukeeans 
expect their water to seem ‘safe’ and perpetually drinkable, even before revelations of the 
widespread LSLs.  The same interviewee noted that “depending upon where you live in the city 
of Milwaukee, you turn your water on and it may come out discolored” (Director of FLAC 
partner organization, phone interview).  And yet, it is illuminating to set this reality alongside the 
responses of those Milwaukeeans who do unquestioningly see their water supply as drinkable 
and harmless; the above quote was immediately followed with an anecdote about her daughter: 
My daughter lives over on the East side, off of Brady, and um, she was washing 
her dishes one day, and she’s got a set of white dishes, and she said the water was 
yellow. So she ran a glass of the water and then went in her bathroom and the 
water there came out clear. And she put the two glasses side by side, and said 
what the hell is—she took a picture and texted me—she said ‘what the hell is 
going on’? And I said ‘what the hell is going on is I just ordered you a water filter 
off of Amazon and it will be delivered tomorrow (Director of FLAC partner 
organization, phone interview). 
 
This complex negotiation of the differentiated pattern of risk in the city of Milwaukee seems to 
imply that while not all residents have access to have objectively safe, drinkable water, some 
residents should — or at the very least, have come to expect that they should.  For certain 
residents, turning on the tap to find discolored water serves as enough of a shock to drive an 
immediate response to mediate potential risk; for other residents in the city, discolored water is 
simply what they have come to expect when they turn on the tap, meaning for these residents, 
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any potential ‘riskiness’ due to lead is disguised by the fact that normal water already appears 
risky. 
Not only is the crisis ‘invisible’ in that LSLs are subterranean, but confirmation of the 
spatial extent of the LSLs is hidden in the history of Milwaukee’s infrastructural development.  
In order to determine the spatial extent of the LSL crisis, the city has relied upon the year each 
house was built as evidence of risk, based on the presumption that certain materials were used 
during specific years of development.  Because water systems are a network of city-owned 
service lines combined with property-owned lines, identification of risk is contingent upon 
identifying both city- and property-side materials.  However, verifying these materials requires a 
laborious examination of the uneven and uncertain records kept over decades of unsupervised 
private-side development.  Former MWW Commissioner Carrie Lewis explained:  
What [material] is on the private side is not recorded anywhere. What’s on the 
private side may be recorded, I am told by plumbing inspection, as a little note on 
the permit when the inspector went to inspect the installation in the house, but that 
isn’t catalogued, that isn’t collected and searchable except on those individual 
pieces of paper (Water Quality Task Force Meeting, February 10, 2017). 
 
Given the unevenness of such record keeping, LSLs — particularly those laid on the private-side 
between 1951 and 1962 — pose a doubly invisible risk to the residents of these homes.  These 
laterals are not only invisible in that they are buried in the ground, but because proof of the risk 
is oftentimes non-existent in official records, meaning their ‘riskiness’ might go uncounted by 
official city maps and estimates.    
Currently, official city maps (Figure 2) and listings of ‘at-risk’ properties are based on 
records of homes built prior to 1962, the year in which the City of Milwaukee mandated the 
exclusive use of copper pipes for service lines.  However, previous estimates of risk — including 
the 70,000 residences that had received the initial letter from MWW — had relied on the 
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assumption that lead pipes had not been used after 1951.  This amendment, changing the 
dividing line between safety and danger from 1951 to 1962, added an additional 12,000 potential 
homes to the pool of at-risk residences, immediately rendering previously innocuous homes sites 
of risk.  Even with this amendment, there continues to be ambiguity in which homes are affected; 
the City routinely used lead for service lines prior to 1951, but did not officially mandate the use 
of copper until 1962, making the additional 12,000 homes precarious zones of risk and safety, 
with only one way to definitively reveal if the possible threat is real: to locate the pipe and 
examine it.  This physical and temporal invisibility further contributes to the sense that the lead 
laterals are a spectral crisis: a potentially widespread crisis that eludes official methods of 
identification.  To mediate this unknowability of the geographic distribution of risk, both FLAC 
and the City of Milwaukee have made efforts to help residents verify the risk on their own, by 
testing to see if their pipes are indeed made of lead (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 9 — “Test a service line to see if it is made of lead” 
Source: City of Milwaukee 
 
 
Confirming that a service line is made from lead only constitutes part of the calculation 
of risk, which is tied not only to the presence of LSLs but also to the unpredictable way they 
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affect the toxicity of water as it moves through the laterals, a further ‘invisibility’ of the risk 
associated with LSLs.  Although testing may indeed reveal elevated lead levels, the toxicity is 
prone to fluctuate, spiking as lead particles flake off the pipes into the moving water and at times 
dwindling to ‘risk-free’ levels.  Risk here is not just invisible but unpredictable, subsiding and 
reemerging in an unpredictable fashion that may defy a definitive scientific classification as 
either at-risk or risk-free.  When one activist found out their lead blood level was 17 bbp, they 
did everything possible to uncover the source of lead exposure; because this activist lived in a 
home with LSLs and did not have any other ‘risky’ behaviors, process of elimination seemed to 
guarantee that risk exposure must have come from the taps.  As Miranda put it, “[she] doesn't eat 
paint chips, she doesn't eat mud pies1 and she isn't out snorting windowsill dust. The only way 
she got that, and she knows it, is she drank water from her lead line tap at her home” (R. 
Miranda, phone interview).  And yet, testing the taps proved to be infuriatingly inconclusive:  
We tested the water in my master [bedroom] sink and it was higher than at my 
kitchen sink, but that means nothing because you know, the test is only good for 
that minute. You know, you test two hours later and get a different test result, two 
weeks later and have different test results. The thing I learned about testing water 
is don’t do it.  Stop testing your water and just buy the filter. (Director of FLAC 
partner organization, phone interview). 
 
This frustration demonstrates that testing, purportedly a means to identifying risk, can in fact 
serve to highlight the unknowability of lead, even when risk has been otherwise proven to be 
demonstrably evident in one’s body, as it was for this FLAC member.  Although process of 
elimination seemed to imply that the exposure had to have come from the taps, the uneven 
toxicity results did little more to confirm or refute the riskiness of the activists LSLs.  This 
ambiguity further contributes to a conditional sense of the riskiness of lead that organizers must 
                                                 
 
1 The “mud pies” reference here is to possible exposure via lead in the soil, which is most accessible for children 
who are crawling or playing outside and may ingest soil. 
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overcome; the risk is at once spectral and threatening, while not yet discernable enough to drive 
behavior changes or activism. 
Further, because water in each municipality has a unique chemical composition, testing 
for lead and the subsequent interpretation of the test results is both a proprietary action and 
proprietary knowledge which cannot be personally undertaken by residents.  Water testing must 
be specifically calibrated in laboratories to refer to the characteristics of the sampled water, 
requiring residents to either purchase testing kits which may then be sent off for calibration and 
testing, or actively seek out the help of city agencies.  While these at-home kits are relatively 
affordable and widely available at most home goods stores, none of them are certified by the 
EPA or any other government agency; by contrast, those laboratories that are EPA-certified 
routinely work exclusively with businesses or city agencies, and will decline to provide testing 
for individual homeowners.  Municipal agencies such as MWW, on the other hand, have not 
made testing widely available, and they will decline test water samples that are brought to their 
offices by residents, for the specific reasons considered above: the risk changes from minute to 
minute, and samples must be verified at the source.  Unsurprisingly, residents at one SSCHC 
lead education event repeatedly asked for information on how they could get themselves and 
their water tested for lead.  In spite of these hurdles, one activist seemed to imply that a failure to 
understand how to test one’s water was due to a lack of personal motivation, explaining that “all 
of that stuff [information about testing] is available easily on the internet if they’re [residents] 
super curious….it’s just that people gotta make that decision that they want to be tested” 
(Director of FLAC partner organization, phone interview).  In this accounting, homeowners are 
powerless to influence the chemical composition of their drinking water, are denied recourse to a 
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means of independently ascertaining whether the water could indeed be considered ‘safe,’ and 
are yet obligated to be personally responsible for finding a way to obtain that information. 
Perhaps most sinister, given the spatial distribution of risk of Milwaukee’s lead laterals, 
are the ‘invisible’ effects of long-term lead exposure in the body.  The majority of scientific 
research of lead exposure has focused on either the developmental effects of lead on pregnant 
women and children under the age of six; studies of exposure in adults tend explore the effects of 
high-dose, anomalous exposure, such as may be related to travel or workplace hazards.  
Although lead bio-accumulates (remaining in the body and building up over time) long term, 
low-dose exposure — such as might be caused by Milwaukee’s LSLs — has received much less 
scientific attention.  The studies that have explored the effects of lead poisoning in adults have 
revealed that effects of long term, low-dose exposure may be ‘invisible’ in another sense, in that 
they are easily conflated with the effects of genetics, poverty, and what might be pejoratively 
referred to as “lifestyle choices.”  Recent tests have revealed that even low-level lead exposure 
can lead to high blood pressure, stroke and cardiovascular disease for adults (Lanphear et al. 
2018, Navas-Acien et al. 2007), health outcomes which are more often considered to be the 
unlucky result of genetics, lack of exercise and poor diet.  Lead exposure can also cause 
irritability, and affect decision-making ability and intelligence, effects which are more readily 
considered individual character traits than health outcomes (CDC, 2017). 
Further, lead exposure can be compounded by the effects of diet; an EPA publication 
notes that “children with empty stomachs absorb more lead than children with full stomachs” 
(EPA, 2001), a reality which disproportionately affects families living in poverty.  Hunger and 
poverty are inextricably linked, and there is a clear correlation to be made between one’s 
physical ability to mitigate the effects of lead poisoning and one’s socioeconomic status, a 
  
91 
 
connection we should not overlook, given the way poverty and segregation is tied to the spatial 
distribution of risks posed by LSLs in Milwaukee.  This potential invisibility — the insidious 
connection between the long-term effects of lead poisoning and disenfranchised communities, is 
one that is almost too immense to comprehend: 
As more and more of this stuff comes out, more and more it shows that 
communities that are poor, especially communities of color, that their kids are 
being poisoned by this.  I mean, it was back in the 1990s that they knew lead 
caused violent behavior and disturbed behavior and…you know, poor ability to 
get through school, but you just think the narrative is that it’s “these people” or 
“poor people,” you just shrug your shoulders. ….Let’s look at what we’ve 
wrought over these last 30, 40 years, of not paying attention to this. (Community 
advocate, phone interview). 
 
This is the magnitude of what FLAC — and Milwaukee — might be truly be reckoning with: the 
invisible effects of lead on generations of certain communities, effects that have been racialized 
and dismissed as “these people,” to use this community advocate’s words.  Taken this way, we 
must perhaps reconsider whether FLAC is indeed organizing ‘in the absence of a crisis,’ or if it is 
more apt to argue that they are organizing around a crisis so difficult to detect, so latent, and so 
oft dismissed that it has become not a crisis, but a chronic state.  
•       •       • 
As these findings have attempted to demonstrate, FLAC’s struggles to bring the LSL 
crisis onto the public and political radar is hampered not only by a lack of political will and 
government misdirection, but also by the very nature of the crisis.  Lead itself, and its uneven 
and invisible effects upon both bodies and space, has contributed significantly to the organizing 
hurdles the group faces.  These hurdles are compounded by residents’ willingness to assume 
responsibility for pursuing and maintaining interim solutions, reducing the risk to acceptable 
levels and reliving political pressure for expensive government solutions.  However, these 
interim measures protect only those Milwaukeeans who can afford interim solutions, potentially 
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leaving residents who are already most at-risk for lead exposure doubly underserved — unable to 
access interim solutions, and easily dismissed by a government that sees the crisis as effectively 
managed.  These findings not only carry practical implications for future activists’ efforts and 
practices, but also for future research into local social movements. 
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6 - CONCLUSION 
 
 
This research expands social-movement and framing theories to understand the dynamics 
between framings and non-humans, and the implications for the effectiveness of social 
movement efforts. It does so by exploring not only the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational 
frames employed by a local social movement, but also by examining the external factors that 
have inhibited or conditioned the effects of these frames.  The ideal combined effect of 
diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framings is to mobilize activism in service of proposed 
solutions for the identified problem; this interconnected nature means that external factors will 
not simply affect one element of a social movement’s framing, but will have implications for 
each discursive element and for the overall efficacy of the movement’s goals. This analysis 
demonstrates how the effects of external factors — specifically, the often invisible role of non-
humans — can in fact be fundamental to a local social movement’s efforts to address urban lead 
contamination.    
This brings us full circle back to the question I posed of my own behavior at the outset — 
what, exactly, facilitates such a complex and uneasy relationship with my lead laterals?  The 
conclusion seems to be that a variety of factors together contribute to a sense of unknowability of 
risk and responsibility, to which social movement actors have sought to respond with clarity.  
The limited publicly available information on the crisis, the repeated refutations by elected 
officials and the City’s experience with lead abatement and water technology has contributed to 
public confusion or denial as to the extent of the crisis, or ignorance of its very existence 
(sections 5.1, 5.2).  The uneven effects of place, race and political opportunity throughout 
Milwaukee’s neighborhoods have made the risks of lead exposure ‘invisible’ — both by dint of 
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the unintentionally mitigating effects of wealth and Whiteness, and because the effects of lead 
exposure are easily conflated with the effects of poverty and segregation (section 5.3).  
Municipal responses to the crisis have been insufficient to the magnitude of its effects, and have 
emphasized individual responsibility over government-led solutions, which has the effect of 
further penalizing those residents who are most afflicted by lead exposure, and unable to afford 
interim solutions (section 5.4). Lastly, lead itself contributes greatly to this uneasy and uneven 
relationship — ‘invisible’ in many ways, lead has proven a uniquely difficult contaminant 
around which to organize a social movement (section 5.5). 
FLAC has gone to great lengths to account for the unknowability of lead, and the 
unevenness of its effects in Milwaukee's water supply.  This can be seen in the group’s efforts to 
reveal the science behind lead’s ‘invisible’ embodied effects, and their determined emphasis on 
the uneven relationship between race, poverty, and lead poisoning, which disproportionately 
affects certain neighborhoods for reasons that are insufficiently addressed by existing efforts to 
remediate lead risks.  Although the group is many ways cognizant of the dynamics of non-
humans, they have yet primarily employed framings that emphasize the social and political 
conditions that have made current patterns of lead exposure problematic.  While these dynamics 
are critical to the current case study, alternative frames that more directly engaged with the 
unique characteristics of lead would certainly be possible, and would not prohibit an emphasis on 
socio-political factors.  For example, a framing which emphasized the unknowability of lead 
— the ‘invisible’ threat in 70,000 homes — would not preclude a framing of government 
malfeasance.  Rather, such a framing would benefit from illuminating the ways in which 
government action has unevenly distributed this ‘invisible’ threat, exacerbating its effects and its 
unknowability for certain areas of the city.  This study therefore carries practical implications for 
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local social movement and activist practice.  By revealing the dynamics of non-humans in the 
current case study, it is my hope that subsequent framings can not only take seriously the role of 
non-humans, but also discursively relate and respond to the conditions they produce. 
Recognizing the role of non-humans in social movements offers an important opportunity 
for future research to analyze how framings have — and have not — managed to take seriously 
the role of non-humans in shaping or constraining collective-action frames.  Following this 
study’s findings, future research might help to reveal if an explicit recognition of the properties 
and capabilities of non-humans leads to more nuanced — and successful — collective-action 
frames.  Using Milwaukee’s local social movement efforts to remediate lead laterals as a case 
study, this research demonstrates that there may be significant theoretical and practical insights 
to be gleaned from recognizing the role of non-humans in framing activity.  
This study also has practical implications for policy, as it demonstrates that the trend in 
Milwaukee towards short-term solutions and mitigation strategies places an undue burden on 
residents and alleviates political pressure for long-term solutions to remove all of the city’s lead 
service lines.  FLAC’s focus has always been on full removal of all of the city’s lead laterals, at 
no cost to homeowners; although their framings have adapted to include demands for interim 
measures, as well, it remains to be seen how the group will continue to generate public interest 
and political will to pursue expensive and complex solutions for a crisis that, while still existing 
in 70,000 homes, has been — for some residents — effectively reduced to a manageable, ‘risk-
free’ level. 
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Appendix A - Milwaukee Water Works letter to LSL property owners 
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Appendix B – List of interview participants 
 
Name (if applicable) and occupation / affiliation Interview Type 
Robert Miranda, Founder of FLAC Phone interview, In-person 
interview 
FLAC partner/organizer  
 
In-person interview 
Director of FLAC partner organization 
 
Phone interview 
Community Advocate Phone interview 
 
Milwaukee Budget Specialist 
 
Phone interview 
 
Milwaukee Fiscal Planning Specialist Phone interview 
 
Community organizer, FLAC partner organization 
 
In-person interview 
 
FLAC activist 
 
In-person interview 
 
FLAC activist 
 
In-person interview 
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Appendix C – List of interview questions 
 
• When did you first find out about Milwaukee’s lead laterals? 
• How did you find out about Milwaukee’s lead laterals? 
• What do you know about where Milwaukee’s lead laterals are located? 
• Is your home / neighborhood impacted by Milwaukee’s lead laterals? 
• Do you know if your home is one of the addresses with potential lead laterals? 
• What do you understand to be the risks posed by the lead laterals? 
• In your opinion, for whom do the lead laterals pose the greatest risk? 
• What actions, if any, have you taken in your own life to minimize the risks (as you 
understand them)? 
• What actions, if any, do you plan to take in the future to minimize the risks (as you 
understand them)? 
• How have you decided which actions to take to minimize the risks?  
• What actions have you seen the city undertake to minimize the risks posed by the lead 
laterals? 
• What further actions do you believe the city should take? 
• What is your relationship to FLAC (the Freshwater for Life Action Coalition)? 
• Are you involved in any of FLAC’s efforts? If so, how? If not, why?  
• What do you understand to be FLAC’s mission? 
• Do you agree with FLAC’s mission? If not, why not? If not entirely, in what ways? 
• What actions have been undertaken by FLAC to minimize the risks posed by the lead 
laterals? 
• What further actions do you expect them to take? 
• In your opinion, are certain Milwaukeeans more involved than others in this social 
movement? If so, who? 
• In your opinion, what drives Milwaukeeans to be more / less involved in this movement? 
 
 
